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"Other People's Faiths": The
Scientology Litigation and the
Justiciability of Religious Fraud
By MARJORIE HEINS*

Then stood there up one in the council, a Pharisee, named Gamaliel, a doctor of
the law, had in reputation among all the people, and commanded to put the
apostles forth a little space;
And said unto them, Ye men of Israel, take heed to yourselves what ye intend to
do as touching these men ...
...Refrain from these men, and let them alone: for if this counsel or this work
be of men, it will come to nought:
But if it be of God, ye cannot overthrow it; lest haply ye be found even to fight
against God.'

Introduction
2
The proliferation of new religions has engendered hot dispute.
* Associate, Palmer & Dodge, Boston. B.A., 1967, Cornell University; J.D., 1978,
Harvard University. The author represented several churches of Scientology while an associate at Silverglate, Shapiro & Gertner (now Silverglate & Gertner), Boston, in 1979 and
1980. Discussions with Harvey A. Silverglate and Thomas G. Shapiro helped to formulate
some of the ideas expressed in this article.
1. Acts ofthe Apostles 5:34-39 (King James).
2. In popular parlance, these new religious groups are known as cults. Although the
word has attained a derogatory connotation, it simply means a new religion, often centering
around a charismatic leader. A sect, by contrast, is a secession from, or subgroup of, a more
stable and "often culturally dominant religious group." See S. AHLSTROM, A RELIGIOUS
HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE 473 (1972). See generally S. AHLSTROM, .supra,at 47374; Wilson, The HistoricalStudy ofMarginalAmerican Religious Movements, in RELIGIOUS
MOVEMENTS IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICA 603-11 (I. Zaretsky & M. Leone eds. 1974); Colloquium, Alternative Religions Government Control and the First Amendment, 9 N.Y.U.
REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 1 (1980).
New religions, whether originating as sects or cults, are characteristic of United States
history. "In the radical antinomian tradition alone, the accretions have been continuous,
from Mistress Anne Hutchinson in the 1630's to Timothy Leary in the 1960's." S.AHLSTROM, supra, at 4. In the contemporary revival, at least four strains have been identified:
"human-potential" movements, evangelical fundamentalism, "Eastern" mystical religions,
and authoritarian cults. See Anthony, The FactPatternBehind the DeprogrammingControversy. An Analysis andan Alternative, in Colloquium, supra, at 73, 75. A 1976 estimate put
total membership in the "one thousand religious cults active in the United States" at "three
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These groups, despite wide divergence in views and practices, are often
regarded as manifestations of the same social phenomena. They usually are thought to have in common a demand for more intense commitment on the part of adherents than conventional churches require, a
penchant for highly effective persuasive techniques, and a particular
appeal to the young.' Opposition to the new religions has ranged from
impassioned journalism to hearings before legislative committees and
direct action in the form of by now commonplace deprogramming escapades. In the manner of other highly charged and perhaps intractable social antagonisms, the battle also has found its way into the courts.
Some of the early litigation involved guardianship or conservatorship proceedings. The results of these contests were mixed, since
courts generally understood the formidable constitutional obstacles to
adjudicating claims that otherwise competent young adults had been
brainwashed by religion.4 There also were legal skirmishes over
million young Americans." F. CONWAY & J. SIEGELMAN, SNAPPING 12 (1978) (citing U.S.
NEWS & WORLD REP., June 14, 1976, at 52).
The revival has, of course, not been limited to new religions: fundamentalist Christianity and Judaism have also gained adherents. See C. STONER & J. PARKE, ALL GOD'S CHILDREN Xiii (1977).
3. Descriptive literature on the new religions abounds. It ranges from undogmatic,
scholarly work, e.g., RELIGIOUS MOVEMENTS IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICA, supra note 2, to
highly emotional polemics, e.g., A. RUDIN & M. RUDIN, PRISON OR PARADISE?: THE NEW
RELIGIOUS CULTS (1980). Opponents sometimes seek to distinguish the new groups in some
fundamental way from past bizarre or demanding faiths, e.g., F. CONWAY & J. SIEGELMAN,
supra note 2, at 37-52, while advocates of First Amendment equal protection argue for evenhandedness, e.g., Pfeffer, EqualProtectionforUnpopularSects, in Colloquium, supra note 2,
at 9, 15. In his exhaustive study, Professor Delgado attempts to differentiate the new religions from earlier ones to justify a program of intervention in their activities at a variety of
points, from regulation of recruitment to after-the-fact damage suits. Delgado, Religious
Totalism: Gentle and Ungentle PersuasionUnder the FirstAmendment, 51 S.CAL. L. REV. I
(1977).
4. See, e.g., Schuppin v. Unification Church, 435 F. Supp. 603 (D. Vt. 1977) (dismissing parents' action seeking adjudication of daughter's mental competency); Katz v. Superior Court, 73 Cal. App. 3d 952, 141 Cal. Rptr. 234 (1977) (reversing trial court's grant of
conservatorship over young adult members of Unification Church), Helander v. Salonen,
No. HC 7-75 (D.C. Super. Ct. Sept. 23, 1975) (order dismissing habeas corpus petition for
custody of Unification Church member); In re Shapiro, Civ. No. 471805 (Middlesex, Mass.
P. Ct. June 24, 1977) (refusing to grant guardianship over member of International Society
for Krishna Consciousness). A brief in Katz described that conservatorship proceeding in
part as follows: "Typically, (the parents') attorney.., would read a passage from the Divine Princple, the major theological work of the Church, and then ask the proposed conservatee: 'And you, student with college-level education, seriously believe this?!"' Note,
ConservatorshipsandReligious Cults: Divininga Theory ofFreeExercise, 53 N.Y.U. L. REv.
1247, 1255 n.53 (1978). See also Note, Legal Issues in the Use of GuardianshipProceduresto
Remove Members of Cults, 18 ARIz. L. REV. 1095 (1976); Comment, "Mind Control" or
Intensity ofFaith: The ConstitutionalProtection ofReligious Belie/s, 13 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 751 (1978); Note, People v. Religious Cults: Legal GuidelinesforCriminalActivities,Tort
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deprogramming, 5 sometimes with allegations of kidnapping or false
imprisonment on one side, and with allegations of mental coercion or
trickery on the other.6 In the midst of this often emotional spectacle of
parents seeking to "rescue" their adult children from "pseudoreligions," the First Amendment came in for a measure of abuse.'
Damage lawsuits, often for large sums, have also been brought.
Parents may allege a tort cause of action for loss of services or alienation of affections.' Former adherents, on the other hand, frequently
Liability, and ParentalRemedies, 11 SUFFOLK L. REv. 1025 (1977); Note, Abduction, Religious Sects and the Free Exercise Guarantee, 25 SYRACUSE L. REv. 623 (1974).
5. See, e.g., Alexander v. Unification Church of America, 634 F.2d 673 (2d Cir. 1980)
(deprogrammers' allegations that church used litigation in attempt to destroy them, and that
it maintained constant surveillance of them, held sufficient to state claims for abuse of process and intentional infliction of emotional distress); Rankin v. Howard, 633 F.2d 844 (9th
Cir. 1980) (no dismissal on judicial immunity grounds where judge alleged to have conspired with parents to attain guardianship and effect deprogramming); United States v. Patrick, 532 F.2d 142 (9th Cir. 1976) (dismissing on double jeopardy grounds government's
appeal from Patrick's acquittal on kidnapping charge; trial court had permitted defense of
necessity); Mandelkorn v. Patrick, 359 F. Supp. 692 (D.D.C. 1973) (denying motion to dismiss 42 U.S.C. § 1985 conspiracy action against Patrick and others).
6. See, e.g., Weiss v. Patrick, 453 F. Supp. 717, 723 (D.R.I.), affdper curiam, 588 F.2d
818 (Ist Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 929 (1979) (judgment for defendant deprogrammers in action for false imprisonment, assault and battery and civil rights violations because
court disbelieved plaintiff's testimony that she had been restrained against her will and
found, in any case, that "limitation upon her personal mobility was not her primary concern"); Peterson v. Sorlien, 299 N.W.2d 123, 129 (Minn. 1980) (parents' restriction of their
adult child's freedom for purpose of deprogramming held not to constitute false imprisonment where they believed child's 'Judgmental capacity" was impaired and sought to extricate her from what they "reasonably" thought to be a "religious or pseudo-religious cult,"
and she later consented); People v. Murphy, 98 Misc. 2d 235, 413 N.Y.S.2d 540 (Sup. Ct.
1977) (dismissing, on First Amendment grounds, unlawful imprisonment and attempted
grand larceny indictments against members of International Society for Krishna Consciousness; the grand jury had initially investigated an alleged kidnapping of a member by her
mother and a deprogrammer). Another tort suit against deprogrammers has been brought
in Buffalo, New York, by a twenty-seven-year-old woman who was a student at Maharishi
International University and a practitioner of transcendental meditation. N.Y. Times, Feb.
15, 1981, at 44,col. I. Whether or not victims of such kidnappings ultimately win damages
from deprogrammers or parents, of course, the parents have in many cases paid substantial
amounts of money for what turned out to be unsuccessful "cures." See, e.g., C. STONER & J.
PARKE, supra note 2, at 377-409.
7. See, e.g., F. CONWAY & J. SIEGELMAN, supra note 2, at 16 (cults rely on "the impenetrable legal sanctions of the First Amendment"); Delgado, supra note 3, at 46-48 (proselytizing and religious practices not protected because of "deception and intensive mind control
techniques" which "diminish, rather than increase, the ability of the victim to make private
decisions about his life"; First Amendment is designed "to prevent oppression of small,
struggling minorities rather than affording them a right to become more powerful relative to
other groups"); C. STONER & J. PARKE, supra note 2, at xvii ("we've heard parents argue
persuasively that the first amendment to our Constitution should be modified for Americans'
own protection").
8. See, e.g., Kieffer v. Holy Spirit Ass'n for Unification of World Christianity, Civ. No.
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claim fraud or breach of contract on the theory that promises or representations made to them by the church, or by a minister or recruiter,
were false. Such promises range from the relatively worldly and spe-

cific (e.g., salary or certain level of economic support in exchange for
church work) to the ineffable and primarily spiritual (e.g, cure of neurosis or general unhappiness in exchange for adherence). Suits by relatives and renegades also have included claims of intentional infliction
of emotional distress, false imprisonment or even involuntary servitude, and coercive persuasion or mind control. 9

Such tort and contract litigation has been particularly persistent
against one of the older and better established of the controversial new

religions, Scientology.l0 This article is drawn in part from issues raised

and work done in connection with the defense of several churches of

Scientology in four lawsuits brought in Boston in 1979 and 1980." In
these suits, former Scientologists sought multi-million dollar damages
for allegedly fraudulent misrepresentation of the benefits to be derived

from auditing, 2 Scientology's main practice, and the process by which
77-381-D (D.N.H. Sept. 23, 1980) (order setting aside damage judgment and ordering new
trial); Schuppin v. Unification Church, 435 F. Supp. 603 (D. Vt. 1977).
9. See, e.g., Turner v. Unification Church, 473 F. Supp. 367 (D.R.I. 1978), af'dper
curiam, 602 F.2d 458 (1st Cir. 1979); cases cited in note 8 supra & note 11 infra.
10. There is not room here to do justice to the intriguing story of Scientology's founding, originally as "Dianetics," by L. Ron Hubbard from strands of science fiction and occultism; its development from a "science of mental health" into a church; and its intricate
theology. An intelligent, nonpolemical account is rendered by Whitehead, Reasonably Fantastic: Some Perspectives on Scientology, Science Fiction and Occultism, in RELIGIOUS
MOVEMENTS IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICA, supra note 2, at 550-87.
11. Van Schaick v. Church of Scientology of California, Civ. No. 79-2491-G (D. Mass.
filed Dec. 13, 1979); Church of Scientology of Boston, Inc., v. Garritano, Civ. No. 40906
(Mass. Super. Ct., Suffolk County, counterclaim dismissed in part, July 14, 1980); Troy v.
Church of Scientology of Boston, Civ. No. 41073 (Mass. Super. Ct., Suffolk County filed
Apr. 2, 1980); Hansen v. Church of Scientology of Boston, Civ. No. 41074 (Mass. Super. Ct.,
Suffolk County filed Apr. 2, 1980). The first judgment against a Church of Scientology for
consumer fraud and "outrageous conduct," Christofferson v. Church of Scientology of Portland, No. A7704-05184 (Or. Cir. Ct., Multnomah County Sept. 5, 1979), appealdocketed,
No. 15952 (Ct. App. Oct. 31, 1979), totalling $2.3 million, may have inspired the Boston
suits.
12. During auditing, the member speaks about his or her problems with an auditor,
who is like a minister, while holding cans connected to a skin galvanometer called the Hubbard Electrometer, or E-meter, which registers responses. A stable E-meter reading means
that the member has successfully worked through a particular problem. The auditor takes
copious notes which are later reviewed by a supervisor.
The theory is that the verbal exchange enables the "preclear" adherent to discover the
aberrations or "engrams" (imprints of traumatic events in his or her past life or lives) that
inhibit the full flowering of mental powers, and attendant spiritual and physical well-being.
The goal is an enhanced and potent mental state called "clear." The concept thus resembles
both religious and secular forms of therapy, as well as more traditional faith healing.
The plaintiffs alleged that they had been told auditing would cure neurosis, heighten
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it seeks to assuage mental and spiritual ills. They also claimed breach
of contract, based on the same representations or promises, and inten-

tional infliction of emotional distress, allegedly caused by auditing and
other church practices to which they had consented at the time of their
membership. None of the plaintiffs accused the church of inflicting
physical harm.' 3 Some of the plaintiffs had themselves been auditors

or recruiters for the church before quitting; one had returned for additional auditing periodically for some ten years. Others had been in and
out of the organization within six months.' 4
These contract, fraud and mind-control claims put squarely in issue the truth or falsity, as well as the propriety, of doctrines that had
been held out as religious. The plaintiffs argued that questioning the

verity of these doctrines was permissible, first, because Scientology was
not really a religion, and second, even if it were, its founder, organizers,

and recruiters were not sincere in the beliefs they preached. To support
this second theory, the plaintiffs accused the church of harboring commercial rather than spiritual motivations and spread through their

pleadings and briefs allusions to tortious conduct and to the recent
criminal convictions of eleven leading Scientologists.15 The relief
sought in one suit was virtual dissolution of the church.'"
It is the argument of this article that where a religion is attacked as
not bonafide, allegations of crimes, torts or commercial motives beg the
First Amendment question, for although a church may be guilty of secular offenses, it nonetheless remains a church, entitled to whatever
resistance to colds, increase their IQ's, improve eyesight, increase career opportunities, and
enhance domestic life. Plaintiffs Troy and Hansen also claimed that the church had falsely
promised that it was working for a better world. Amended Complaint at 2, Troy v. Church
of Scientology of Boston, Civ. No. 41073 (Mass. Super. Ct., Suffolk County filed Apr. 2,
1980); Amended Complaint at 2-3, Hansen v. Church of Scientology of Boston, Civ. No.
41074 (Mass. Super. Ct., Suffolk County filed Apr. 2, 1980).
13. In the one case where false imprisonment was pleaded, Church of Scientology v.
Garritano, Civ. No. 40906 (Mass. Super. Ct., Suffolk County, counterclaim dismissed in
part, July 14, 1980), the tort was based on allegations of mental, rather than physical,
coercion.
14. The four counterclaimants in Church of Scientology v. Garritano, Civ. No. 40906
(Mass. Super. Ct., Suffolk County, counterclaim dismissed in part, July 14, 1980), were longstanding members. Plaintiffs Troy and Hansen had remained in the church only a few
months. Plaintiff Van Schaick had been in and out of the Nevada church over a period of
about nine years.
15. United States v. Hubbard, Crim. No. 78-0401 (D.D.C., findings of guilt entered,
Oct. 26, 1979). Decisions on various pretrial motions are reported at 474 F. Supp. 64, 90
(D.D.C. 1979) and 493 F. Supp. 202, 206, 209 (D.D.C. 1979).
16. The complaint in Van Schaick v. Church of Scientology, Civ. No. 79-2491-G (D.
Mass. filed Dec. 13, 1979) sought $200 million plus attachment of church real estate and a
receivership over church assets.
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shield the Constitution offers, unless its doctrines are simply not religious in a broad functional sense. Religious groups undoubtedly are
not immune from tort claims, including those brought for some varieties of fraud. Where the alleged fraud derives from the church's beliefs, however, courts ought to be wary of entertaining such claims,
regardless of the sincerity or hypocrisy with which the beliefs are
propounded.
Courts should be equally wary of religious fraud claims asserted in
the more loaded terminology of mind control or brainwashing, for, as
one court noted in the context of a conservatorship case, the issue is the
same: "Evidence was introduced of the actions of the proposed conservatees in changing their life style. When the court is asked to determine whether that change was induced by faith or by coercive
persuasion is7 it not in turn investigating and questioning the validity of
'
that faith?"'
The starting point of any discussion of religious fraud is the
Supreme Court's decision in UnitedStates v. Ballard.'8 That case, discussed in Part I, 9 held that in a fraud prosecution of religious leaders,
the factfinder was constitutionally prohibited from inquiring into the
truth or falsity of the defendants' religious representations and beliefs.
Ballardleft open questions, however, that have since worried courts in
a variety of other contexts. This article specifically addresses three of
those questions: (1) What constitutes religious status that will trigger
Ballardimmunity? (2) Can a test of sincerity substitute for the inquiry
into religious truth proscribed by Ballard? (3) In what context will a
representation be deemed religious rather than secular, thus rendering
the immunity appropriate?
Whether parties asserting religious status satisfy the constitutional
definition of religion must be the first inquiry. It is preliminary, of
course, to determining whether or not First Amendment protection attaches, but it also is necessary to preserve the integrity of religion and
conscience as constitutional and moral categories. No matter how difficult and value laden the application of a present-day constitutional definition of religion may be, courts cannot avoid it. In the long run it is
easier and less intrusive on religious liberty than is inquiring into the
17. Katz v. Superior Court, 73 Cal. App. 3d 952, 987, 141 Cal. Rptr. 234, 255 (1977). A
thoughtful analysis of the "serious epistemological problems" attending use of the term
mind control in the context of the new religions is offered by Robbins, ReligiousMovements,
the State, and the Law: Reconceptualizing "the Cult Problem," in Colloquium, supra note 2,
at 33, 37.
18. 322 U.S. 78 (1944).
19. See text accompanying notes 27-95 infra.
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truth of beliefs or into the sincerity with which they are held. The con-

stitutional test of religious status, which derives from conscientious objector litigation and modem theology and focuses on beliefs that
radiate ultimate concern about life and its meaning, is outlined in Part
11.20

Once a party's religious status is established, it ought not be put to
a further test of sincerity. An allegation that a church is not bonafide
or that some of its members or its ruling hierarchy are not genuine
believers should not render judicially cognizable issues of religious ver-

ity or legitimacy that otherwise would be beyond a court's capacity.
Even though some religious hucksters may escape liability because of
this rule, its justifications outweigh its defects. A central justification,
as Justice Jackson pointed out in his separate opinion in Ballard,21 is
that questions of religious sincerity cannot meaningfully be separated
from questions of religious falsity or truth. The issue of sincerity is
analyzed in Part 111. 21

Religious status, however, does not protect a church or minister
whose statements or actions were made in a secular context. Nor, as
the Supreme Court pointed out in Cantwell v. Connecticut,23 could an
imposter gain comfort from the free exercise clause if accused of fraud-

ulently impersonating a representative of a particular faith. Part IV
addresses the problem of separating religious from secular contexts. 24
This article deals with the scope and applicability of the Ballard

immunity, including the threshhold questions of status, sincerity and
context introduced above. 25 Because such questions should be ad20. See text accompanying notes 96-142 infra.
21. 322 U.S. at 92-95 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
22. See text accompanying notes 143-81 infra.
23. 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
24. See text accompanying notes 182-211 infra.
25. This article does not survey the entire range of First Amendment issues lurking
behind the Boston Scientology litigation or in like cases elsewhere. Questions of religious
freedom arise in almost every stage of these suits, from applicability of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 201-19 (1938), see, e.g., Mitchell v. Pilgrim Holiness Church Corp.,
210 F.2d 879 (7th Cir. 1954), to scope of discovery, see, e.g., Worldwide Church of God, Inc.
v. California, 623 F.2d 613 (9th Cir. 1980). Nor does it address the compelling state interest
and least restrictive alternative analysis that would be called upon when a religious practice
conflicts with public interests or with the rights of persons outside the church. Although a
simple belief-action distinction is not dispositive of such issues, see, e.g., McDaniel v. Paty,
435 U.S. 618, 635 n.2 (1978) (Brennan, J., concurring), the compelling state interest test is
arguably irrelevant where the claims, however imaginatively framed, in essence attack belief
and verbal persuasion. For the development of compelling state interest analysis and the
belief-action dichotomy see, e.g., McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 626-27 (1978); Wisconsin
v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 220 (1972); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963); Cantwell v.
Connecticut, 310 U.S. 290, 303-04 (1940); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
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dressed early in religious fraud litigation, a brief final section touches
on the appropriate procedural stages for deciding them.26
I. Ballard and its Reverberations
A. Pre-Ballard Litigation
The Ballard family was not the first to be accused of mail fraud
based on religious representations. New v. UnitedStates27 involved the
prosecution of a Dr. New and others and reached the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals in 1917. The adjudicability of religious falsity was
decided by that court much the same way that the trial judge was to
resolve it twenty-five years later in Ballard.28 Citing as authority two
earlier mail fraud decisions,29 the Ninth Circuit, in response to Dr.
New's argument that the indictment violated his religious freedom,
explained:
The government in no way sought by the indictment to prevent
the defendants from honestly and sincerely entertaining the views
26. See text accompanying notes 212-16 infra.
27. 245 F. 710 (9th Cir. 1917), cert. denied, 246 U.S. 665 (1918).
28. The pertinent parts of the trial judge's instructions in Ballard are recorded both by
the Supreme Court, 322 U.S. at 81-82, and by the court of appeals, 138 F.2d 540, 545 (9th
Cir. 1943).
29. United States v. White, 150 F. 378 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1906); Post v. United States, 135
F. I (5th Cir. 1905). In Post, the court reversed a mail fraud conviction; the court reported
that the defendant had claimed "to possess the power to cure all, or nearly all, diseases; to
remove the conditions that produce poverty, and to inspire or cause those conditions that
bring success; to restore hair to its natural color, and to grow it on bald heads; to alleviate or
remove many unfavorable conditions; to remove the evidences of old age, and to restore
youth, if the patient had faith that it could be done. .. ." Id at 3. The court thought the
government had not proved its case. "If the defendant intended to administer and did administer the treatment she advertised, she is not guilty of the fraud charged, although the
treatment may be in fact ... valueless." Id at 5.
White involved a reported jury charge drawing the familiar, if elusive, distinction between bad faith and viability. The defendant had claimed to "impart most wonderful and
important knowledge and power," 150 F. at 380, by means of charms, amulets, parchments
and hypnotism.
Similar issues have arisen in other cases. See Dolan v. Hurley, 283 F. 695 (D. Mass.
1922) (lucky stones); State v. Handzik, 410 Ill. 295, 102 N.E.2d 340 (1951) (faith healing),
cert.denied, 343 U.S. 927 (1952); McMasters v. State, 21 Okla. Crim. 318, 207 P. 566 (1922)
(spiritualism); cases discussed in text accompanying notes 185-90 infra. A 1924 civil fraud
claim, similar in some respects to the contemporary suits against Scientology, resulted in
plaintiffs' recovery of property they had donated to a group called the House of David in
order to become members. Hansel v. Purnell, I F.2d 266 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 266 U.S.
617 (1924). The court found that the leader had fraudulently claimed the group was organized for the advancement of the Kingdom of God, when in fact he was motivated by desire
for private gain and gratification of lust. 1 F.2d at 270. The record of Purnell's "licentious
practices" so scandalized the court that it found them to be proof of religious insincerity. Id
at 271-72.
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the indictment alleges they pretended to entertain, nor from honestly and sincerely endeavoring to persuade others, by any legitimate means, to embrace the same notions. But what the
government did undertake to do.. . was to prevent by indictment the defendants thereto from pretending to entertain the
views therein specifically alleged for the false and fraudulent purpose of procuring money or other things of value from third parties by use of its post office establishment.3 0
The factual question of pretense was thus thought to be separate
from the truth or falsity of the claims Dr. New had made regarding his
possession of supernatural powers to "conquer disease, death, poverty,
and misery," which in turn he claimed to have achieved through various forms of "righteous conduct."3 The court noted the government's
allegations that Dr. New
had no supernatural power or authority of any kind or character,
but was an imposter, an heretic, a seeker of vainglory, a coveter
of his neighbor's goods and his neighbor's wife, and was also an
habitual indulger in each and every of the sins and practices he
pretended to condemn.3 2
This accusation obviously muddled the separate issues of truth
and good faith, yet the court appeared to ground its affirmance on evidence of Dr. New's hypocrisy. 33 There was neither separate analysis of
the constitutional issue nor investigation of falsity as an essential element of fraud.
B. The BallardOpinions
Guy and Edna Ballard had founded the "I Am" movement in
1930. Combining right-wing demagoguery with theosophy and recipes
for healing, personal self-fulfillment and success, the movement spread
'34
with alacrity and "filled the largest halls in one city after another.
Guy Ballard claimed to be a divine messenger of St. Germain and to be
capable, as he asserted his wife Edna and son Donald were, of supernatural feats, including "the power to heal persons of ailments and diseases." 35 Followers contributed funds on the basis of such claims; they
also purchased phonograph records that were said to bestow "great
blessings."36
In the trial of Edna, Donald and others for mail fraud (Guy died
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

245 F. 710, 712 (9th Cir. 1917), cert. denied, 246 U.S. 665 (1918) (emphasis added).
245 F. at 713.
Id
Id
S. AHLSTROM, supra note 2, at 927, 1043.
United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 80 (1944).
Id at 84 n.1.
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before trial), the judge, reasoning as the court of appeals had in New,
instructed the jury not to pass on the truth or believability of the Ballards' claims, but to decide only whether the defendants "honestly and
in good faith" believed "that Jesus came down and dictated, or that
Saint Germain came down and dictated"3 7 to them. If they did not so
believe, but instead "used the mail for the purpose of getting money,
trial court
the jury should find them guilty."38 This instruction, the
39
case."
this
into
come
cannot
"religion
that
assured
said,
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, perhaps aware that the sort of
religious fraud instructions it had previously approved in New sanctioned conviction without a finding as to actual falsity, reversed the
Ballards' convictions. The court held that the question of verity could
not be taken from the jury.40 The government appealed that ruling,
while the defendants urged that reversal of their convictions was justified in any event on other grounds.4 1
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that religious falsity could
not be adjudicated. Justice Douglas, writing for the majority, proclaimed that "[f]reedom of thought, which includes freedom of religious belief,. . . embraces the right to maintain theories of life and of
death and of the hereafter which are rank heresy to followers of the
orthodox faiths."'4 2 Justice Douglas illustrated this point with an easily
accessible reference:
Many take their gospel from the New Testament. But it would
hardly be supposed that they could be tried before a jury charged
with the duty of determining whether those teachings contained
false representations. The miracles of the New Testament, the
Divinity of Christ, life after death, the power of prayer are deep
in the religious convictions of many. If one could be sent to jail
because a jury in a hostile environment found those teachings
37. Id at 81-82.
38. -Id at 82.
39. Id
40. Ballard v. United States, 138 F.2d 540, 545 (9th Cir. 1943). In explaining why the
issue of verity should not have been taken from the jury, Judge Denman, concurring in the
denial of the government's petition for rehearing, said, "It would be strong evidence in support of this issue of the mental condition of belief, that these transactions with Jesus actually
occurred in their presence. The right to produce such evidence was denied appellants
ld at 546. If the reason for excluding such evidence is "because such facts could
.
occur in no possible chain of natural material causation, it is a denial to the religious of the
right to prove one of the bases of their [religious] belief in the intervention of the supernatural in the daily lives of human beings-an obvious denial of the freedom of religion of the
First Amendment." Id It is difficult to say whether or not the foregoing was written with
tongue in cheek.
41. 322 U.S. at 85.
42. Id at 86.
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false, little indeed would be left of religious freedom.4 3
That the Ballards' claims were bizarre, extreme, or incredible to most
pious Americans made no difference, because the First Amendment
was designed precisely to afford "the widest possible toleration of conflicting views."" If a jury could decide their truth or falsity, "then the
same can be done with the religious beliefs of any sect. When the triers
of fact undertake that task, they enter a forbidden domain."4 5
Despite its inspirational ring, this language did not resolve the underlying problem in the Ballardprosecution. The decision sidestepped
the crucial issue of sincerity. That, in addition to all other questions

raised but not treated in the opinion, was left for the court of appeals
on remand.4 6

Chief Justice Stone, writing separately for himself and Justices
Roberts and Frankfurter, would have reversed the appellate decision
and reinstated the convictions, thus rejecting the defendants' remaining
contentions. Stone did not believe that "freedom of thought and worship includes freedom to procure money by making knowingly false
statements about one's religious experiences."'47 For him, the issue of
43. Id at 87.
44. Id
45. Id
46. Id at 88. Because of Justice Jackson's dissent (actually a concurring opinion as to
the issue decided and only a dissent as to the outcome-remand versus dismissal), some
commentators have assumed that Ballardexpressly allowed adjudication of sincerity in religious fraud cases, or at least approved the trial court's instruction in that respect, e.g., R.
MORGAN, THE SUPREME COURT AND RELIGION 150 (1972); L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 859 (1978); Boyan, Defning Religion in OperationalandInsitutionalTerms,
116 U. PA. L. Rnv. 479, 492 n.54 (1968); Delgado, supra note 3, at 38; Note, Toward a
Constitutional Definition of Religion, 91 HARV. L. Rnv. 1056, 1063 n.43 (1978). See also
Justice Brennan's separate opinion in Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 610 (1961), in
which he cited Ballardto counter the Braunfeld majority's statement that a state might believe sincerity inquiries would "run afoul of the spirit of constitutionally protected religious
guarantees." Id at 609 (majority opinion); People v. Woody, 61 Cal. 2d 716, 726, 394 P.2d
813, 821, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69, 77 (1964).
Although the Braunfeld majority ignored Ballard when it made its intriguing suggestion, the text of the Ballardopinion does not support the implication Justice Brennan derived from it, and the difficulties in the sincerity adjudication have been noted repeatedly by
the Court since Braunfeld. See Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 457 (1971); Sherbert
v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 407 (1963) (a Brennan opinion). Both courts and commentators
have recognized that in fact the Ballard majority skirted the issue. See Katz v. Superior
Court, 73 Cal. App. 3d 952, 988, 141 Cal. Rptr. 234, 256 (1977); M. KoNviTZ, RELIGIOUS
LIBERTY AND CONSCIENCE 39 (1968); P. KURLAND, RELIGION AND THE LAW OF CHURCH
AND STATE AND THE SUPREME COURT 78 (1962). Two courts have read Justice Jackson's
views into the majority opinion, Banks v. Board of Pub. Instruction, 314 F. Supp. 285, 29596 (S.D. Fla. 1970), vacatedandremanded, 401 U.S. 988, afl'dpercuriam, 450 F.2d 1103 (5th
Cir. 1971); Sheldon v. Fannin, 221 F. Supp. 766, 775 (D. Ariz. 1963).
47. 322 U.S. at 89 (Stone, C.J., dissenting).
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verity was simply swallowed up in the single overriding question of
good faith or fraudulent intent. He noted that "[s]ince the indictment
and the evidence support the conviction, it is irrelevant whether the
religious experiences alleged did or did not in fact occur or whether
that issue could or could not, for constitutional reasons, have been
rightly submitted to the jury."4
Justice Jackson, by contrast, agreed with the majority but urged
that it should have gone on to eliminate the sincerity issue as well. His
dissent is probably the most cogent appreciation extant of the essential
indissolubility of the inquiries into verity and sincerity in determinations of religious fraud.
Jackson began the argument by noting, "as a matter of either practice or philosophy,"49 the difficulty of separating the sincerity and verity issues.5" He then discussed the nonjusticiability, on psychological
grounds, of questions of "intellectual honesty in religion."'" Relying
upon William James' studies, he contended that:
[Psychic experiences] cannot be verified to the minds of those
whose field of consciousness does not include religious insight.
When one comes to trial which turns on any aspect of religious
belief or representation, unbelievers among his judges are likely
not to understand and are almost certain not to believe him.5 2
Justice Jackson argued further that the issue of sincerity was very likely
irrelevant in any case:
I do not know what degree of skepticism or disbelief in a religious representation amounts to actionable fraud. .

.

. Some

who profess belief in the Bible read literally what others read as
allegory or metaphor, as they read Aesop's fables. Religious
symbolism is even used by some with the same mental reservations one has in teaching of Santa Claus or Uncle Sam or Easter
bunnies [to] dispassionate judges. It is hard in matters so mystical to say how literally one is bound to believe the doctrine he
teaches and even more difficult to say how far it is reliance upon
48. Id at 90.
49. Id. at 92 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
50. "I do not see how we can separate an issue as to what is believed from considerations as to what is believable. The most convincing proof that one believes his statements is
to show that they have been true in his experience. Likewise, that one knowingly falsified is
best proved by showing that what he said happened never did happen. How can the Government prove these persons knew something to be false which it cannot prove to be false?
If we try religious sincerity severed from religious verity, we isolate the dispute from the very
considerations which in common experience provide its most reliable answer." Id at 92-93
(Jackson, J., dissenting).
51. Id at 93.
52. Id
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a teacher's literal belief which induces followers to give him
money. 3

The dissent concluded with an intellectual's perhaps obligatory
statement of aversion to the "mental and spiritual poison" 54 purveyed
by the Ballards and their ilk. "But that is precisely the thing the Con-

stitution puts beyond the reach of the prosecutor, for the price of freedom of religion or of speech or of the press is that we must put up with,
and even pay for, a good deal of rubbish.

'55

Fraudulent representa-

tions by religious entrepreneurs on "matters other than faith or experience" were surely not protected, but litigating statements about
religious beliefs, experiences, and powers "reaches into wholly dangerous ground. . . . I would dismiss the indictment and have done with
this business of judicially examining other people's faiths.

56

C. Reasoning: The Majority's and Justice Jackson's Views
As several commentators have acknowledged, Justice Jackson was
right.5 7 The very reasons underlying the majority holding demonstrate

the cogency of his dissent. The primary reason, of course, is the text
and history of the First Amendment. Subjecting religious beliefs, no

matter how outlandish, to adjudication by juries or even by judges affords the occasion to suppress heresy. Indeed, the characterization of
outlandishness is already value laden, for the beliefs of the Ballards, of

Scientologists, and of many others are absurd only in the minds of
nonbelievers. The innumerable healings and other miraculous events
surely seem
that form the core of conventional Christian doctrine
58

equally outlandish by any evidentiary courtroom test.

53. Id at 93-94.
54. id at 95.
55. Id Jackson did not distinguish here among religion, speech, and press guarantees.
Of course, the issue in Ballardwas whether or not statements otherwise actionable as fraud,
despite freedom of speech, were nonetheless not actionable because religious.
56. Id On remand, the court of appeals again did not grapple with sincerity, except to
approve the Chief Justice's view. At first, it affirmed the convictions without opinion; later,
in denying a petition for rehearing, it did produce a brief written decision, 152 F.2d 941 (9th
Cir. 1945), rev'don other grounds,329 U.S. 187 (1946). Judge Denman wrote a lengthy and
vigorous dissent. For an exhaustive analysis of the Supreme Court's three opinions in Ballard, see Weiss, Privilege, Posture,and Protectiorn "Religion" in the Law, 73 YALE L.J. 593
(1964).
57. E.g., M. KoNvrTz, supra note 46, at 41-44; P. KURLAND, supra note 46, at 78-79; L.
TRIBE, supra note 46, at 860-62; Giannella, Religious Liber, Nonestabishment,and Doctrinal Development-PartI, the Religious Liberty Guarantee, 80 HARv. L. R v. 1381, 1417-18
(1967). Giannella would limit the reach of Jackson's argument to "cases where government
would otherwise act to protect gullible citizens from spurious religious movements" and
would not apply it to cases wherein "individuals make claim for special treatment vis-a-vis
the state." Id at 1418.
58. A jury instruction sometimes given to illustrate the nature of inference, for example,
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That accusations of religious falsity will, in great likelihood, be
made only against churches or cults considered abhorrent or threaten-

ing 59 underlines the constitutionally fundamental nature of Ballard,for
protection from majoritarian persecution above all else forms the basis
not only of the twin religion clauses, but also, as the Supreme Court has
noted, of the founding of the nation: "Nothing but the most telling of
personal experiences in religious persecution suffered by our forbears
• . . could have planted our belief in liberty of religious opinion any
more deeply in our heritage."6 0

This primary textual and historical reason for Ballard also can be
understood either in terms of the proscription against governmental es-

tablishments of religion or simply in terms of equal protection.6 ' That
is, to allow adjudication of the verity of beliefs would be to oppress the

weaker or less popular faiths by treating them differently from the
more popular ones, thereby "establishing" the latter. In a nation whose
history has been and remains crowded with iconoclastic cults, sects,

and insular theocratic communities, such a nondiscrimination or
nonestablishment standard both protects and explains the multiplicity
of religions.
Whether viewed in terms of free exercise, of nonestablishment, or
of equal treatment, the essence of the constitutional text and history is a

fear of witch hunts-a concern for tolerance. It is just this fear and
concern that both compels the Ballard holding and informs Justice
Jackson's dissent.
Beyond text and history, and common to both free exercise and
freedom of speech, is the notion of "breathing space,"62 needed if the

"free competition of the market" is to flourish.63 To forestall suffocadescribes going to sleep after observing bare ground, waking up to find snow, and concluding that it had snowed during the night. A religious explanation might well be otherwise.
59. Occasional exceptions to this general rule can be found. See, e.g., Hallinan v. Roman Catholic Archbishop, 247 Cal. App. 2d 410, 55 Cal. Rptr. 542 (1966) (challenging Roman Catholic doctrine), cer. denied, 389 U.S. 820 (1967).
60. School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 214 (1963).
61. See McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 643-46 (1978) (White, J., concurring); Sherbert
v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 409-10 (1963); Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U.S. 67, 70 (1953)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring). In the much-quoted language of Everson v. Board of Educ.,
330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947), "Neither a state nor the Federal Government can. . . pass laws which
aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another." The first two of these
three proscriptions focus on nonestablishment; the third has an equal protection cast. See
also Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 449-51 (1971); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S.
97, 103-04 (1968).
62. The respiratory metaphor is from New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,
272 (1964).
63. The economic metaphor is from Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919)
(Holmes, J., dissenting), and although the free marketplace idea has some weaknesses, par-
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tion, courts should scrutinize closely litigation that threatens to choke
religious speech or exercise. The very inquiry into belief, whether by
the courts, by government agencies, or by adverse parties through discovery, tends to inhibit religious practice and excessively entangles secular bodies in religious doings." This is true whether the inquisitions
probe verity or sincerity.
Another reason for the majority decision in Ballard is simply a
concern for the sanctity of religious conscience. Its importance has

been recognized in conscientious objector cases65 and probably accounts for the long standing congressional willingness to exempt religious pacifists from military service, despite the Supreme Court's stated
view that Congress is not obliged to do so.66 As Chief Justice Hughes

explained in a famous dissent: "[I]n the forum of conscience, duty to a
moral power higher than the State has always been maintained."6 7

That the duty in question must be spiritually generated before its custodian qualifies for exemption illustrates the difficulty of subjecting either

truth or sincerity of belief to adjudication.
One further reason underlying Ballard finds root in a long standing Supreme Court doctrine. In 1872, the Court had decided, without

recourse to the First Amendment, that courts could not adjudicate internal religious factional disputes.6" Fleshing out this proscription in a
ticularly where heavy expenditure can distort electoral choice, see First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976), it is apt in describing the
process by which religious entities unknown a generation ago have successfully competed
for the loyalty of a portion of American youth. For whatever might be said in derogation of
the techniques employed by the new religions, their means of persuasion operate at considerable disadvantage in comparison with the opportunities for "mind control" of an established religion which may educate and indoctrinate children before they have learned to
read and may continue the process through their childhoods and teens. See, e.g., Lemon v.
Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 634 (1971) (Douglas, J., concurring); Everson v. Board of Educ.,
330 U.S. 1, 22-24 (1947) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
64. Cf.Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 620 (1971) ("state inspection and evaluation
of the religious content of a religious organization is fraught with the sort of entanglement
that the Constitution forbids"); Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 674-75 (1970) (taxing
religious organizations would lead to more entanglement than maintaining tax exemptions);
Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 314 (1952) (no excessive entanglement where state merely
suspends school hours so that those students who so desire may "repair to their religious
sanctuary"); Surinach v. Pesquera de Busquets, 604 F.2d 73, 75-78 (1st Cir. 1979) (Puerto
Rico's regulatory scheme bodes excessive entanglement with church schools).
65. Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 445 (1971); United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S.
163, 170-72 (1965); United States v. Sisson, 297 F. Supp. 902, 910-11 (D. Mass. 1969), appeal
dismissed, 399 U.S. 267 (1970). See also M. KoNvrrZ, supra note 46, at 86-87.
66. See Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 356 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring); Hamilton v. Board of Regents, 293 U.S. 245, 264-65 (1934); Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S.
11, 29 (1905).
67. United States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605, 633 (1931) (Hughes, C.J., dissenting).
68. Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679 (1872). Although it did not rely upon the
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series of modem cases, the Court has distinguished between church disputes that can be resolved by neutral legal principles and those that
would require judicial immersion in ecclesiastical practice or doctrine.69 Where a dispute is incapable of neutral resolution, religious
authority becomes the only recourse, even if unpalatable results sometimes ensue.7 °

This principle is a corollary of Ballard: By the terms of the establishment and free exercise clauses, controversies turning on the examination of religious tenets or the interpretation of orthodoxy are not
justiciable. This is true whether those inviting the courts into religious
quagmires are dissident church members, former members, or relatives
of members. It is not material, for constitutional purposes, whether a
lawsuit seeks judicial intervention in church doctrine in favor of a particular faction or judgment that a religion is a fraud.
Finally, implicit in the Ballard holding is a consciousness of the
nonjusticiability, on a pragmatic level, of the verity of religious
claims-the inherent incapability of assessing spiritual phenomena by
reasonable inferences, more-likely-than-not standards, and evidentiary
rules about admissibility, reliability, competence and expert scientific
opinion. This, of course, is one of Justice Jackson's main points. As do
the other reasons underlying Ballard, it enforces the wisdom of his
view.
D. Emergence of the Status, Sincerity, and Context Questions
1. Carruthers
Barely a year after Ballard, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals
7t that a jury could assess not only
said in United States v. Carruthers
First Amendment analysis, the Court in Watson did point out that judicial intervention in
religious controversies would entangle judges in "the whole subject of the doctrinal theology, the usages and customs, the written laws, and fundamental organization of every religous denomination." Id at 733.
69. See, e.g., Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese for the United States and Canada v.
Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696 (1976) (reversing Illinois Supreme Court judgment that a
bishop's defrocking violated fundamental fairness as well as the church's own procedures);
Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S.
440 (1969) (refusing to decide whether church had departed from its doctrine in suit over
church property); Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94 (1952) (invalidating statute
that transferred church control from Soviet Union to North America as unlawful interference with free exercise).
70. See Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese for the United States and Canada v.
Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 714-15 (1976); Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94,
130 (1952) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
71. 152 F.2d 512 (7th Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 327 U.S. 787 (1946).
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sincerity but also the religious nature of representations; that is,
whether or not the defendant "was claiming to advance a religious doctrine."' 72 In Carruthers,the defendant, fouider and head of an ethically
flavored self-improvement racket in which he sold shares with certain
promises of return, had not held the enterprise out as religious. At his
trial, however, he raised a religion defense as to some of his representations. The jury was told not to consider the truth or falsity of73any statement which it found had been made in a religious context.
Carruthersthus permitted a jury to determine-or, in essence, define-what is religious, at least where a party had not erected a religious framework beforehand and in that sense had put potential
adherents on notice as to the nature and ultimate unprovability of
statements made. 74 Arguably, Carruthersis wrong even on this narrow
point. The secular-religious distinction is delicate and is subject to
majoritarian abuse; like other "constitutional fact" determinations, it
should be made by a judge.7 5 Certainly, where a religious stage has
been set beforehand, it should not be questioned by either judge or jury
unless the "religion" does not qualify as such in a definitional sense.
2 Founding Church
A generation after Ballard,the decision was applied to the young
Church of Scientology in Founding Church of Scientology of Washington, D.C. v. UnitedStates. 76 The United States had brought a condem77
nation action under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act
against the "E-meter," a skin galvanometer used in auditing sessions to
ascertain the subject's emotional response. 78 The government said that
the device had been falsely represented ("mislabeled") in Scientology
literature as efficacious in treating physical ills.7 9 At the time, auditing

was done both as a church service and as the therapeutic aspect of the
secular discipline, Dianetics, which predated Scientology.
72. 152 F.2d at 518. This issue was undisputed in Ballard. The trial judge in Christofferson v. Church of Scientology of Portland, No. A7704-05184 (Or. Cir. Ct., Multnomah
County Sept. 5, 1979), appealdocketed, No. 15952 (Ct. App. Oct. 31, 1979), did the same
even though the parties had stipulated that Scientology was a religion.
73. 152 F.2d at 518.
74. See text accompanying notes 182-211 infra.
75. See Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 187-89 (1964); P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO & H. WECHSLER, HART & WECHSLER's THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL
SYsTEM 601-10 (2d ed. 1973).
76. 409 F.2d 1146, 1161 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 963 (1969).
77. 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-92 (1976).
78. For a description of auditing, see note 12 supra.
79. 409 F.2d at 1151.
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On appeal of a jury's findings of falsity in labeling and of a district
court's judgment condemning the meter and ordering its destruction,
Judge Wright, for the District of Columbia Circuit, applied the teaching of Ballard. He concluded that, in view of the appellants' claim that
statements made about the E-meter and its role in auditing manifested
Scientology's religious belief, any falsity in such statements could not
be considered "labeling" within the meaning of the federal law."0 This
was because in adjudicating false labeling, the jury might have inquired, contrary to Ballard, into the validity of religious beliefs.8 ' A
new trial was ordered, at which only literature or statements that had
been offered in a secular context would be submitted to the falsity
factfnder8 2
Judge Wright alluded repeatedly to the government's failure to
challenge the church's assertion that it was a religion. 3 It is unclear
from the decision, however, how the government could have rebutted
the church'sprimafacie showing of religious status, which the court
said it had made through evidence of religious incorporation; performance by licensed ministers of marriages, burials, and the like; and, most
importantly, "fundamental writings contain[ing] a general account of
man and his nature comparable in scope, if not in content, to those of
some recognized religions." 4
Since the creed and literature of Scientology set out a comprehensive religious system that addressed questions of "man and his nature,"8 5 the court's suggestion that a showing might be made of "merely
a commercial enterprise, without the underlying theories of man's nature or his place in the Universe which characterize recognized religions,"" would seem to have been foreclosed. The government's
80. 409 F.2d at 1159-60. The court noted that "[t]he statements concerning the powers
of auditing over the ills of mind and body are not readily separable from general statements
of Scientological doctrines concerning the nature of man and the relationship of his mind to
his body. Many will find these doctrines, those which relate to health as well as those which
do not, absurd or incoherent. But the Ballard case makes suspect the legal inquisition of
such doctrines where they are held as religious tenets." Id at 1159. The belief that auditing
could cure a wide variety of physical ailments derived from Dianetics' view of their psychosomatic origin. See id at 1151-52. See generally notes 10 & 12 supra.
81. 409 F.2d at 1161-62, 1164.
82. The court thus rejected both the government's position that since action and not just
belief was involved, the First Amendment was irrelevant, and the church's position that the
entire case must fail as an unconstitutional persecution of religion. Id at 1154.
83. Id at 1154, 1156, 1159, 1160, 1161, 1162, 1165.
84. Id at 1160. For a discussion of the definition of religion and qualification for religious status, see text accompanying notes 94-142 infra.
85. 409 F.2d at 1160.
86. Id.
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rebuttal thus could only have been an attempted proof of insincerity or
of sham on the part of the founding or current hierarchy of the
church.8 7 The difficulties of such proof, as outlined by Justice Jackson
in Ballard and as acknowledged by Judge Wright,8 8 are compounded
when corporate or group sincerity is at issue. 89 Judge Wright appeared
to recognize all this when he opined that Ballardwould apply to civil
suits for fraud and deceit:
[U]nder Ballard it seems unlikely that a disgruntled former adherent could sue a church for fraud and deceit because it had
collected money from him on the basis of allegedly "false" doctrines concerning salvation, heaven and hell-or for that matter
on the basis of doctrines, such as those of the Christian Scientists,
concerning the cause and cure of disease. 90
There was no suggestion that such suits could go forward simply if a
plaintiff pleaded that the Church of Christ, Scientist, or a particular
Christian Science practitioner, had been insincere.
On remand, District Judge Gesell employed a context inquiry, attempting to distinguish secular from religious use of the E-meter. 9 1
Condemning Scientology .as quackery, the judge found that the "bulk
of the material [on auditing] is replete with false medical and scientific
claims devoid of any religious overlay or reference." 92 The writings
and E-meters had been distributed to the public and were used by laymen for secular purposes. 93 He accordingly ordered cessation of auditing outside the religious context, but, following the appellate court
decision in FoundingChurch, said he could not prohibit auditing, use of
the E-meter, or distribution of Scientology literature under religious
auspices. 94 He did, however, order that a caveat be affixed to the books
95
and meters disclaiming medical or scientific efficacy.
While Ballard forecloses direct inquiry into the truth or falsity of
87. Id at 1162. Judge Wright cited tax exemption, conscientious objector, and drug
cases in which sincerity was thought properly to be at issue. Id at 1160 nn.45-49.
88. Id at 1160 n.46.
89. In the Boston Scientology cases, see note 11 supra, the complaints alleged skepticism or impurity of motive on the part of virtually all church founders and organizers, as
well as of recruiters and administrators in the Boston, Nevada, Florida, New York, and
California churches, over a decade's time.
90. 409 F.2d at 1156 n.32.
91. United States v. An Article or Device, 333 F. Supp. 357, 361-62 (D.D.C. 1971),
amended, No. 71-2064 (D.C. Cir. March 1, 1973) (per curiam). There was no jury on
remand.
92. 333 F. Supp. at 361.
93. Id at 362.
94. Id at 363-64.
95. Id at 364-65. The court of appeals simplified the order to avoid "excessive entanglement with religion." No. 71-2064, slip op. at 1 (D.C. Cir. March 1, 1973). The court-
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beliefs in religious fraud litigation, courts applying Ballard, as shown
above, can diverge over issues that the decision left unresolved. Consistent application of the Ballardimmunity presupposes consistent approaches to the integrally related questions of religious status, sincerity
and context. These questions are explored in the next three sections.
II.

Status-The Definitional Dilemma

A. The Early Theism Test
The Supreme Court's definition of religion has relaxed considerably since the early days when legitimate faiths were confined to the
conventionally theistic, and even then, only to doctrines or practices
not thought improper or immoral.96 From its rejection of a constitutional challenge to a criminal conviction for polygamy in Reynolds v.
UnitedStates, 7 to its approval, eleven years later, of the government's
dissolution of the Mormon Church, 98 the Court simply defined out of
constitutional existence, as either nonreligious or only pretextually so,
tenets with which conventional Judeo-Christianity took issue:
One pretence for this obstinate course is, that [the Mormons'] belief in the practice of polygamy, or in the right to indulge in it, is
a religious belief, and therefore, under the protection of the constitutional guaranty of religious freedom. This is altogether a sophistical plea ...
The State has a perfect right to prohibit polygamy, and all
other open offences against the enlightened sentiment of mankind, notwithstanding the pretence of religious conviction by
which they may be advocated and practised. 99
In the time between the Mormon decisions and the debate over
conscientious objection from which the present functional definition of
religion emerged, both the Supreme Court and lower courts almost unthinkingly favored theism.I °° The first well-known judicial deviation
ordered disclaimer was duly rendered; by the mid-1970's, auditing was performed only
under the aegis of the church.
96. See generally Linford, The Mormons and the Law: The Poltramy Cases, 9 UTAH L.
REv. 308 (1964).
97. 98 U.S. 145 (1879).
98. Late Corporation of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. United
States, 136 U.S. 1 (1890).
99. Id at 49-50. Similarly, in Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 341-42 (1890), involving a
test oath, the unanimous Court proclaimed of polygamy and bigamy that "[t]o call their
advocacy a tenet of religion is to offend the common sense of mankind."
100. One famous example is Chief Justice Hughes' dissent in United States v. Macintosh,
283 U.S. 605, 633-34 (1931), overruled on othergrounds, Girouard v. United States, 328 U.S.
61 (1946), in which he said, "The essence of religion is belief in a relation to God involving
duties superior to those arising from any human relation." To be fair, the question of
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from the narrow view was a World War II conscientious-objector case,
UnitedStates v. Kauten,0 1 in which Judge Augustus Hand, in rejecting

the objector's claim, nevertheless interpreted the "religious training and
belief' requirement of the Selective Training and Service Act of
1940102 to denote

a sense of the inadequacy of reason as a means of relating the
individual to his fellow-men and to his universe-a sense common to men in the most primitive and in the most highly civilized
societies. It accepts the aid of logic but refuses to be limited by it.
It is a belief finding expression in a conscience which categorically requires the believer to disregard elementary self-interest
and to03accept martyrdom in preference to transgressing its

tenets.'
While the Second Circuit adopted Judge Hand's dicta in the same
year,' °4 the Ninth Circuit, three years later, took the more traditional
view that religion presupposed a Supreme Being. 0 5 Congress wrote
that traditional test into the statute in 1948.106
B. "Ultimate-Concern": The Functional Test

In the late 1950's, both a federal and a state court abandoned theism as a definitional prerequisite to religious exemption and held that
both Ethical Culture and Secular Humanism, respectively, by virtue of
their doctrinal concern with matters of ultimacy and their structural
nontheistic religious belief was not in issue here, and Hughes did "[put] aside dogmas with
their particular conceptions of deity" and imply that "freedom of conscience" may also enjoy constitutional protection. 283 U.S. at 634.
101. 133 F.2d 703 (2d Cir. 1943).
102. Selective Training and Service Act of 1940, ch. 720, § 5, 38 Stat. 887 (1940) (expired
1947) (current version at 50 U.S.C. App. § 4560) (1976)), which permitted exemption for
those who conscientiously oppose "participation in war in any form," provided their opposition arises "by reason of religious training and belief."
103. 133 F.2d at 708. Judge Hand went on to discuss how Socrates, Martin Luther, and
the Greek poet Menander each bowed to a conscientious duty so profound as to be religious.
Even Wordsworth characterized "Duty" as "the 'Stem Daughter of the Voice of God."' Id
Kauten's conviction for failing to appear for induction was upheld on the ground that nothing in the record convinced the court that the failure was due to "a compelling voice of
conscience, which we should regard as a religious impulse." Id
104. United States ex rel. Phillips v. Downer, 135 F.2d 521, 523-24 (2d Cir. 1943).
105. Berman v. United States, 156 F.2d 377 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 795 (1946).
Judge Denman, dissenting in Berman, cited the Hand opinion with approval. 156 F.2d at
384.
106. Selective Service Act of 1948, ch. 625 § 6(j), 62 Stat. 612 (1948) (current version at
50 U.S.C. App. § 456(j) (1976)). See Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 349-51 (1970)
(Harlan, J., concurring); United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 176 (1965). The test was
phrased in terms of Chief Justice Hughes' dissent in Macintosh, see note 100 supra. In 1967,
after the decision in Seeger, the "Supreme Being" language was removed. Pub. L. No. 9040, § 1(7), 81 Stat. 100-02, 104 (1967).
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similarity to conventional faiths, were entitled to property tax exemption." 7 The opinion of the state court laid the theoretical groundwork
and provided some of the language for the Supreme Court's decision in
United States v. Seeger10 eight years later.
Seeger, in essence, read the "Supreme Being" phrase out of the
Selective Service Act of 1948.109 The Court in Seeger interpreted the
statutory requirement of belief in a Supreme Being to mean belief that

"occupies a place in the life of its possessor parallel to that filled by the
orthodox belief in God of one who clearly qualifies for the exemp-

tion." I This was one way to save the conscientious-objector exemption from constitutional infirmity as a preference for one type of
religion over another or even over secular conscience."' The Seeger
107. Washington Ethical Society v. District of Columbia, 249 F.2d 127 (D.C. Cir. 1957)
(Burger, J.); Fellowship of Humanity v. County of Alameda, 153 Cal. App. 2d 673, 315 P.2d
394 (1957).
108. 380 U.S. 163 (1965). The California decision stated that the "only inquiry" can be
the "objective one of whether or not the belief occupies the same place in the lives of its
holders that the orthodox beliefs occupy in the lives of believing majorities, and whether a
given group that claims the exemption conducts itself the way groups conceded to be religious conduct themselves." Fellowship of Humanity v. County of Alameda, 153 Cal. App.
2d 673, 692, 315 P.2d 394, 406 (1957). Both opinions also provided footing for the Supreme
Court's observation in Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495 n.l 1 (1961), that some "religions in this country. . . do not teach what would generally be considered a belief in the
existence of God." Torcaso struck down a theism test for the office of notary public, but its
reasoning suggests that any religious test would have been invalid as a discrimination
against nonbelievers.
109. 380 U.S. at 173-80. See note 106 supra.
110. 380 U.S. at 166. The definition was elaborated upon in Welsh v. United States, 398
U.S. 333, 339-40 (1970) (belief must be held "with the strength of traditional religious convictions"), and in Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 447-48 (1971) (objection to particular wars not within exemption even if it has "such roots in a claimant's conscience and
personality that it is 'religious' in character"). See also Thomas v. Review Bd. of the Ind.
Employment Security Div., 450 U.S. 707, (1981) (reversing Indiana Supreme Court's ruling
that a Jehovah's Witness was not entitled to unemployment compensation because his departure from his weapons manufacturing job was a merely "'personal philosophical choice
rather than a religious choice.'" Id. at 713 (quoting 391 N.E.2d at 113 1)).
111. The effort became more strained in Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970)
which, as Justice Harlan observed in concurrence, "performed a lobotomy" on the statute by
"reading out" of it "any distinction between religiously acquired beliefs and those deriving
from 'essentially political, sociological, or philosophical views or a merely personal moral
code' "-the very distinction that § 456(j) insists upon. Id at 351 (Harlan, J., concurring).
Both Justice Harlan's view and that of the majority in Welsh embody the broad functional definition of religion. The majority, however, by performing the surgery to which
Harlan alluded, essentially merged religion and conscience when conscience is so demanding that it "occupies a place in the life of its possessor parallel to that filled by. . .orthodox
belief in God." 1d. at 344-45. This is as it should be, and as Judge Hand understood it to be
in United States v. Kauten. See text accompanying notes 10 1-03 supra. In early drafts, in
fact, the First Amendment referred to conscience as well as religion and used the terms
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definition thus necessarily has more than statutory application, for earlier courts would have seen little problem with a theistic model that
accorded exemption only to conventional Western religious creeds. I 2
In reflecting and articulating a liberalization of the judicial view of
religion, the Seeger decision was openly influenced by contemporary
theology; it borrowed from Dr. Paul Tillich's definition of God as "the
power of being, which works through those who have no name for
it.""' 3 "Religious training and belief," said the Court, was belief
"based upon a power or being or upon a faith, to which all else is
subordinate or upon which all else is ultimately dependent." ' 14 This
ultimate concern, or functional view of religion, is now generally accepted by commentators" 5 and by courts." 6 Anything more restricinterchangeably. See Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 39 n.27 (1947) (Rutledge, J.,
dissenting); M. DEWOLFE HowE, THE GARDEN AND THE WILDERNESS: RELIGION AND
GOVERNMENT IN AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 20-21 (1965).

That Chief Justice Burger, at least, would not explicitly go this far despite Seeger and
Welsh is evident from his assertion in the majority opinion in Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S.
205, 216 (1972), that Thoreau's choice of lifestyle was "philosophical and personal rather
than religious." Justice Douglas, dissenting in part in Yoder, disputed that point. Id at 24748. See also Africa v. Pennsylvania, Civ. No. 81-2325, slip op. at 19-21 (3d Cir. Oct. 30,
1981) (denying prisoner's claim that MOVE, a back-to-nature movement, was a religion, but
noting, "[i]t is possible, of course, to take issue with the Supreme Court's classification of
Thoreau-like beliefs as non-religious." Id at 20 n.17.
112. The majority in Seeger protested, perhaps too much, that it was not abandoning the
theistic cast of the statute, but simply giving it wide scope. The issue may be only semantic,
but if theism refers to a belief in a god or gods, see 380 U.S. at 174, Seeger clearly seems to
tolerate a nontheistic equivalent, if adhered to with the requisite intensity.
113. 380 U.S. at 180 (quoting 2 P. TILLICH, SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY 12 (1957)). See also
P. TILLICH, DYNAMICS OF FAITH 1-4 (1957). "Faith is the state of being ultimately concerned: the dynamics of faith are the dynamics of man's ultimate concern." Id. at I.
114. 380 U.S. at 176.
115. E.g., L. TRIBE, supra note 46, at §§ 14-16; Boyan, Defining Religion in Operational
and.InstitutionalTerms, 116 U. PA. L. REV. 479 (1968); Giannella, supra note 57, at 1423-31;
Note, Toward a ConstitutionalDefnition of Religion, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1056 (1978); Note,
D§6ningReligio" Of God, the Constitution,and the D.A.R, 32 U. CHI. L. REv. 533 (1965);.
116. E.g., Malnak v. Yogi, 592 F.2d 197, 199-200 (3d Cir. 1979) (Science of Creative
Intelligence/Transcendental Meditation is religion and thus cannot be taught in public
schools); Founding Church of Scientology of Washington, D.C. v. United States, 409 F.2d
1146, 1160-62 (D.C. Cir.) (Scientology meets primaaacietest of religion), cert. denied, 396
U.S. 963 (1969); Remmers v. Brewer, 361 F. Supp. 537, 540-42 (S.D. Iowa. 1973), af'dper
curiam, 494 F.2d 1277 (8th Cir.) (Church of New Song, a prison group, found to be religion,
not sham), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1012 (1974). But see Theriault v. Silber, 453 F. Supp. 254
(W.D. Tex.) (Church of New Song found to be sham, largely on basis of antisocial actions
and perceived insincerity of founders), appealdismissed, 579 F.2d 302 (5th Cir. 1978). The
Church of the New Song cases are discussed at notes 127-31 and accompanying text infra.
Judge Adams, concurring in Mfalnak v. Yogi, noted the confusion in some cases between the definitional and sincerity issues and suggested that in the Theriault litigation the
Seeger definition "cannot be said to have completely carried the field." 592 F.2d at 206
n.30. Another indication that Seeger has not penetrated universally is the Missouri Supreme
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tive, whether in terms of theistic belief, of organized hierarchy, or of

ritual, would offend the nondiscrimination spirit of both Ballard and
Everson v. Board of Education.17
C. Testing for Sham

The gradual erosion of the theistic definition and its replacement
by a nondiscriminatory functional approach to religion does not obviate the need for careful assessment of whether a litigant meets the stan-

dard. If anything, the breadth of the test suggests that courts should be
scrupulous in its application and should not accept without scrutiny
bald assertions by litigants that their beliefs or conduct are religious. A

great deal depends on the initial determination, especially if,
as is argued here, once a belief or set of beliefs qualifies as religious, their

truth or falsity is not justiciable in civil courts, regardless of the insincerity of persons or organizations advancing them.
Without investigating sincerity, however, a court should probably
have some leeway to determine that the doctrines offered as religious

are only a sham. In most circumstances, this should be evident from
the frivolity of the doctrines themselves. As Chief Justice Burger observed in Thomas v. Review Boardof the IndianaEmployment Security
Division, 18 "[olne can, of course, imagine an asserted claim so bizarre,
so clearly nonreligious in motivation, as not to be entitled to protection
under the Free Exercise Clause ... ."119 Thus, the ultimate-concern
Court decision in Missouri Church of Scientology v. State Tax Commission, 560 S.W.2d
837, 840 (1977) (en banc), appealdismissed, 439 U.S. 803 (1978), in which the "religious
worship" requirement of the relevant tax statute was construed to demand "as a necessary
minimum a belief in the Supreme Being of the universe." Seeger was distinguished because
its definition was "not one of constitutional construction but of statutory interpretation."
560 S.W.2d at 841-42.
117. 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947); for a quotation from Everson on the non-discrimination aspect of the First Amendment see note 61 supra. The external factors played a part in Fellowship of Humanity v. County of Alameda, 153 Cal. App. 2d 673, 693, 315 P.2d 394,406-07
(1957), but their absence should not be held against a religious claimant. See Manak v.
Yogi, 592 F.2d 197, 209 (3d Cir. 1979) ("formal, external, or surface signs" cannot be "determinative, at least by their absence, in resolving a question of definition. But they can be
helpful in supporting a conclusion of religious status given the important role such ceremonies play in religious life"); Morey v. Riddell, 205 F. Supp. 918 (S.D. Cal. 1962) (tax deductions for contributions to religious group permissible even though group lacked identifying
name, permanent headquarters, or comprehensive records). But see Universal Life Church,
Inc. v. United States, 372 F. Supp. 770, 772-73, 776 (E.D. Cal. 1974) (mail-order church
entitled to tax refund even though ministerial degrees were sold as "a kind of stock in trade"
and the church's philosophy was "do whatever is right," since the church had an organizational structure and the court viewed the government's challenge to asserted religious status
as an invitation to "consider the merits or fallacies of a religion").
118. 450 U.S. 707 (1981).
119. Id at 715. The comment was occasioned by dispute over whether or not the peti-
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and sham tests can be seen as opposite approaches to the same
question.
United States v. Kuch12 0 illustrates the point. The defendant's
claim, that her use of marijuana was religiously inspired by the tenets
of the Neo-American Church, was defeated simply by enumerating the
church's policies and doctrines: the ministers were called "Boo Hoos";
the symbol was a three-eyed toad; the bulletin was the "Divine Toad
Sweat"; the church key was a bottle opener; the official songs were
"Puff, the Magic Dragon" and "Row, Row, Row Your Boat"; the
motto was "Victory over Horseshit!"'' 2 The church catechism, said the
court, was "full of goofy nonsense." 22 Although there is danger in any
judgment about religious seriousness, Kuch is ample indication that
some line has to be drawn. Without denigrating the possible role of
humor in religion or the cheerful times that must have inspired the
creation of this church and its trappings, one must acknowledge that
the judge in Kuch correctly perceived that this was a little too cute to be
a religion.
A more careful effort to invest drug ingestion with the aura of a
spiritual quest might have enabled Kuch to qualify her Neo-American
Church as a religion under Seeger, or at least to have made hers a
closer case; this, of23course, would not necessarily have exempted her
from prosecution.
In contrast with Kuch, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in Leary
v. United States 24 seemed not to treat with adequate deference doctrines that, as described in the court's opinion, appeared serious enough
to meet the ultimate-concern test. This is not to say either that Leary
adequately proved that the use of marijuana was as integral to his faith
as the ingestion of peyote was to the Native American Church in People
v. Woody,' 25 or that the court in Leary was wrong to hold that a comtioner's conscientious objection to participation in weapons manufacture, an objection not
shared by all members of his faith, was in fact religious.
120. 288 F. Supp. 439 (D.D.C. 1968).
121. Id at 443-45.122. Id at 444.
123. On balancing of religious liberty against a state's compelling interests, see cases
cited in note 25 supra.
124. 383 F.2d 851 (5th Cir. 1967), rev'd on other grounds, 395 U.S. 6 (1969).
125. 61 Cal. 2d 716,394 P.2d 813,40 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1964) (holding that honest and goodfaith use of peyote by the Native American Church as its central ritual was constitutionally
protected). The decision is a near anomaly; most courts, faced with "Woody" defenses to
drug prosecutions, simply distinguish Peyotism and uphold the convictions. Eg., People v.
Crawford, 69 Misc. 2d 500, 328 N.Y.S.2d 747 (Dist. Ct. 1972), a1 7'd, 72 Misc. 2d 1021, 340
N.Y.S.2d 848 (Sup. Ct. 1973).
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12 6
pelling state interest justified infringement upon Leary's religion.
But Leary made the effort that Kuch apparently had not. The opinion
reflects a substantial evidentiary showing of the connection between
hallucinogenic experience and Timothy Leary's variety of Hinduism.
Arguably, then, the court should have found the defendant's drug devotion to be religious.
A series of prison cases involving the "Church of the New
Song"' 27 also illustrates definitional, or sham, adjudication. This
church, also known as Eclatarianism, was developed by a federal prisoner named Henry Theriault and was spread by him and his disciples
throughout prisons in the South and Midwest. Most of the lawsuits
brought by the church or its members simply sought the same opportunities for religious exercise as those permitted prisoners adhering to
conventional faiths.
Although Fifth, Seventh, and Eighth Circuit decisions differed on

126. 383 F.2d at 869-70.
127. In the Fifth Circuit, the litigation began with Theriault v. Carlson, 339 F. Supp. 375
(N.D. Ga. 1972), 353 F. Supp. 1061 (N.D. Ga. 1973), in which Chief District Judge Edenfield ordered prison authorities to allow Theriault to exercise his religion, then held them in
contempt for failing to do so. The court of appeals vacated and remanded this case along
with one arising in the Western District of Texas, where Theriault had been transferred, and
where his request for an evidentiary hearing had been denied, 495 F.2d 390 (5th Cir. 1974).
The two cases were consolidated in Texas, where, after hearing, Judge Wood found that the
Church of the New Song was not a religion and dismissed the suit. Theriault v. Silber, 391
F. Supp. 578 (W.D. Tex. 1975). The Fifth Circuit vacated and remanded on the ground that
the trial court's findings were inadequate. "We ought not to explore this profound problem
without full ventilation by the trial court. When reconsidering what constitutes a religion, a
thorough study of the existing case law should be accompanied by appropriate evidentiary
exploration of philosophical, theological, and other related literature and resources on this
issue." 547 F.2d 1279, 1281 (5th Cir. 1977) (footnote omitted). On remand, the trial judge
merged discussion of definition, sincerity, and compelling state interest, finding against the
church on all three issues, and concluding that "[p]etitioner and his cohorts have formed an
organization whose purpose is to improve the position of member prison inmates vis-A-vis
the prison administrations. To obtain leverage for the organization and to enable it to operate more freely within the Federal Penitentiaries, petitioner has Christened it a 'religion' and
endowed it with the trappings thereof. Thus, it is that the unmistakable stench of the skunk
is found emanating from that which petitioner has declared a rose." Theriault v. Silber, 453
F. Supp. 254, 260 (W.D. Tex.), appealdismissed, 579 F.2d 302 (5th Cir. 1978).
In the Eighth Circuit, a free-exercise claim by two Eclatarians at Iowa State Penitentiary was upheld in Remmers v. Brewer, 361 F. Supp. 537 (S.D. Iowa 1973) (again upholding the free-exercise claim), aff'dper curiam, 494 F.2d 1277 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
1012 (1974),furtherproceedings,396 F. Supp. 145 (S.D. Iowa 1975), remanded, 529 F.2d 656
(8th Cir. 1976), on remandsub non Loney v. Scurr, 474 F. Supp. 1186 (S.D. Iowa 1979).
The Seventh Circuit, where Theriault had also initiated litigation after his transfer to
the federal penitentiary at Marion, found the Texas adjudication controlling and affirmed a
district court's dismissal on res judicata grounds. Church of the New Song v. Establishment
of Religion on Taxpayers' Money, 620 F.2d 648 (7th Cir. 1980).
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whether or not this church qualified for First Amendment status, 128 the
standards they applied were not very different. The Fifth Circuit, instructing the Texas judge below on the necessary elements of a definitional analysis, pointed out that "[obvious] shams and absurdities"
should not be considered religions despite superficial resemblance of
their dogmas to doctrines of ultimate-concern. 2 9 District Judge Hanson, in Iowa, applied a "pervasively pretextual" standard 3 ° addressed
to the same need: maintaining the balance between not passing judgment on the value or verity of religious belief, on the one hand, and
preventing abuse of the liberality of the functional definition, on the
other. The differences in result among these cases seem to have been
caused, in large part, by the importation into the Texas decisions of
matters irrelevant to the definitional inquiry: Theriault's violent behavior, the court's judgments about sincerity, and the church's concern
with prison reform.'

D. Dubious Criteria
In cases involving recognized religions, the definitional phase of
religious fraud litigation is not necessary. When a party's religious status is open to question, however, the ultimate-concern approach, or its
converse, a consideration of superficiality or sham (but not of sincerity), can be used for the initial determination of whether or not a religion is involved. Even if a party qualifies, of course, the statements
challenged as fraudulent may be unprotected because made outside the
religious context. Once First Amendment status attaches, however, no
further inquiry into the sincerity of individuals or the bonafides of the
church should be made.
During a hearing in Boston federal court on a motion to dismiss
one of the Scientology suits, Judge Garrity asserted his belief, based
largely on the findings of Judge Wright in Founding Church of
128. See note 127 supra.
129. Theriault v. Silber, 495 F.2d 390, 395 (5th Cir. 1974). The court cited Kuch approvingly, although in its later decision it criticized the trial judge for adhering too closely to the
Kuch analysis, which it rejected as inconsistent with Seeger to the extent that it suggested
that belief in a Supreme Being was a prerequisite to religious status. 547 F.2d 1279, 1281
(5th Cir. 1977).
130. Loney v. Scurr, 474 F. Supp. 1186, 1192 (S.D. Iowa 1979). Professor Tribe's "arguably religious" standard, see L. TRIBE, supra note 46, at 829-31, appears to afford about the
same leeway to free-exercise claims. See also Wilson v. Beame, 380 F. Supp. 1232, 1242
(E.D.N.Y. 1974) (government must avoid "inhibiting any thoughts or deeds reasonably
characterized as religious").
131. See text accompanying notes 132-42 infra.
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Scientology v. UnitedStates, 3 2 that the defendant Scientology churches

had primafacie religious status, and he obtained a concession from
plaintiffs' counsel to this effect. 133 He then inquired if the plaintiffs, by

their allegations that the churches were not true religions, intended in
effect to rebut, in the manner suggested in Founding Church, theprima
facie case.

Such a rebuttal would inevitably deteriorate into a sincerity trial.
Factors extraneous to the ultimate-concern definition, such as criminal

behavior, commercial motivation, cynicism on the part of particular individuals, or actions not conforming to church stricture, would come
into evidence. The adjudication would thus turn from the nature and
scope of Scientology's doctrines to the conduct, social acceptability and
level of skepticism of church members or of the movement as a whole.
As previously noted, in the Church of the New Song litigation, such
considerations invaded at least one court's determination of whether or
not the doctrines did in fact meet the test of religious status.' 34 Such

considerations obviously are not probative of whether a church's system of beliefs is sufficiently concerned with "man's nature and his place
in the universe," or sufficiently fills a place in adherents' lives comparable to that filled by older religions in the lives of others, to qualify as
religious. As Judge Hanson pointed out in Loney v. Scurr, 135 no prisoner would be entitled to exercise his religion if criminality contraindi136
cated faith.
Justice Douglas made the same point in Wisconsin v. Yoder, 3 7 in

which the Court upheld a free-exercise claim by the Amish for exemption from compulsory education laws. In Yoder, Justice Douglas took
the majority to task for stressing the law-abiding nature of the sect:
A religion is a religion irrespective of what the misdemeanor or
felony records of its members might be. I am not at all sure how
the Catholics, Episcopalians, the Baptists, Jehovah's Witnesses,
132. 409 F.2d 1146 (D.C. Cir.), cert.denied, 396 U.S. 963 (1969). For a discussion of this
case, see text accompanying notes 76-95 supra.
133. Hearing before the Honorable W. Arthur Garrity, Jr., Sept. 10, 1980, Van Schaick v.
Church of Scientology of California, Civ. No. 79-2491-G (D. Mass. filed Dec. 13, 1979).
Judge Garrity has not yet decided the motion as this article went to press.
134. Compare Church of the New Song v. Establishment of Religion on Taxpayer's
Money, 620 F.2d 648, 652 (7th Cir. 1980) (court pointed to findings of violence by Theriault
as evidence that the religion was a sham) with Loney v. Scurr, 474 F. Supp. 1186, 1189 (S.D.
Iowa 1979) (there was no evidence that the Church counseled violence nor was there evidence linking Church activities to disturbances at the Iowa prison).
135. 474 F. Supp. 1186 (S.D. Iowa 1979).
136. Id at 1195. For an extreme example, see also F. DOSTOEVSKY, THE BROTHERS
KARAmAZOV, bk. V, ch. V.
137. 406 U.S. 205, 241 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting in part).
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the Unitarians, and my own Presbyterians would make out if
subjected to such a test. It is, of course, true that if a group or
society was organized to perpetuate crime and if that is its motive, we would have rather startling problems akin to those that
were raised when some years back a particular sect was challenged here as operating on a fraudulent basis. United States v.
Ballard . . . . But no such factors are present here, and the
Amish, whether with a high or low criminal record, certainly
as a religion within the meaning
qualify by all historic standards
138
of the First Amendment.
Determination of religious status thus should rest on the doctrines
themselves and not on the criminal activity or tortious conduct of one
or more adherents.
Commercial motivation is also irrelevant to the definitional determination. This point was made in Murdock v. Pennsylvania,139 one of a
spate of early 1940's cases arising from suppression of proselytizing by
Jehovah's Witnesses. Murdock involved a tax on the sale of religious
literature, defended by the state on the ground that it was simply a
license fee on commercial activity. The Court disagreed:
The mere fact that the religious literature is "sold" by itinerant
preachers rather than "donated" does not transform evangelism
into a commercial enterprise. If it did, then the passing of the
collection plate in church would make the church service a commercial project. . . . It is plain that a religious organization
needs funds to remain a going concern. But an itinerant evangelist, however misguided or intolerant he may be, does not become
a mere book agent by selling the Bible or religious tracts to help
defray his expenses or to sustain him. Freedom of speech, freedom of the press, freedom of religion are available to all, not
merely to those who can pay their own way.14°
Indeed, in Ballarditself, the basis for prosecution was the procurement
of money and the sale of phonograph records upon false representations. If an organization or individual satisfies the definitional test, it
should not matter how much money is made, or whether the money is
procured by donations, sale of tracts or fees for auditing, so long as it is
derived from religious activity. Consideration of a religion's gross
earnings as evidence that its doctrines are a sham would not sit well
or Christian Science any more than it
with the hierarchy of Catholicism
4
1
Scientology.1
with
would
All that has been said of defining religion should apply as well
138. Id at 246-47 (citation omitted).
139. 319 U.S. 105 (1943). See also Follett v. McCormick, 321 U.S. 573, 576 (1944).
140. 319 U.S. at 111.
141. In the free speech realm, see also Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748,762-65 (1976); Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809,
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where a party is not, as a whole or for all purposes, religious, but insists
that particular representations were made in a religious vein. That is, a
determination of whether or not the listener (or the consumer, if you

will) could fairly be thought to be on notice that the representations
were on matters of faith and ultimacy would be based on the criteria of
Seeger. The focus here is on context, an issue that must be faced even
where the party as a whole does qualify as religious. It is the argument

here that after determining status, context should be the only remaining
threshold question,'42 for sincerity is too much a proxy for verity itself
to be a permissible subject of pursuit.
III. Sincerity
Courts in a variety of situations have assumed that the sincerity of
a litigant's religious beliefs is a productive and relevant inquiry. The
case subjects include conscientious objection, 4 3 other governmentgranted exemptions or benefits, 44 religious observance in prisons, 45
and defense to criminal prosecutions for drug use, 146 snake handling, 4 7
818-21 (1975); Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463, 474 (1966); New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 265-66 (1964).
142. For a discussion of context, see text accompanying notes 182-211 infra.
143. Eg.g, Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 338-39 (1970); United States v. Seeger,
380 U.S. 163, 185 (1965).
144. Eg., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 216-19 (1972) (compulsory education past
eighth grade); United States v. Hillyard, 52 F. Supp. 612, 615 (E.D. Wash. 1943) (exemption
from jury duty); Dobkin v. District of Columbia, 194 A.2d 657, 659 (D.C. 1963) (exemption
from appearance in court on Saturday); In re Jenison, 265 Minn. 96, 104, 120 N.W.2d 515,
520 (exemption from jury duty), remanded, 375 U.S. 14, on remand, 267 Minn. 136, 125
N.W.2d 588 (1963). But see Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 609-10 (1961); Sheldon v.
Fannin, 221 F. Supp. 766, 775 (D. Ariz. 1963).
145. Eg., Theriault v. Silber, 453 F. Supp. 254, 261 (W.D. Tex. 1978) (right to practice
religion); United States v. Kahane, 396 F. Supp. 687, 698 (E.D.N.Y.), remanded on other
groundssub nom. United States v. Huss, 520 F.2d 598 (2d Cir.) (kosher food), af'd asmodifledsub nom. Kahane v. Carlson, 527 F.2d 492 (2d Cir. 1975); Teterud v. Gillman, 385 F.
Supp. 153, 156-57 (S.D. Iowa 1974), affIdsub nom. Teterud v. Bums, 522 F.2d 357 (8th Cir.
1975) (religious obligation to wear long hair); Remmers v. Brewer, 361 F. Supp. 537, 541-42
(S.D. Iowa 1973) (right to practice religion); United States ex rel Goings v. Aaron, 350 F.
Supp. 1,4 (D. Minn. 1972) (religious obligation to wear long hair).
146. E.g., In re Grady, 61 Cal. 2d 887, 888, 394 P.2d 728, 729, 39 Cal. Rptr. 912, 913
(1964) (religious use of peyote-remanded for trial on sincerity); People v. Woody, 61 Cal.
2d 716, 726, 394 P.2d 813, 821, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69, 77 (1964) (religious use of peyote not
criminal if defendant's belief is held "honestly and in good faith"); State v. Bullard, 267
N.C. 599, 603, 148 S.E.2d 565, 568 (1966) (suggesting religious assertions as to marijuana
and peyote were insincere).
147. Eg., State ex rel Swam v. Pack, 527 S.W.2d 99, 105-12 (Tenn. 1975) (obvious
sincerity-in fact, hysterical devotion-of pentecostal snake handlers inspired the court to
consider their First Amendment claims scrupulously and to observe that the relevant statute
did not forbid the practice if done prudently), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 954 (1976); Kirk v.
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and practicing medicine without a license. 4 But the extreme difficulty
of making this delicate judgment on sincerity and the probability that
the nondiscrimination aspect of the religion clauses will be abused in
the process have been recognized. 4 9 A few judges have struck down
the "reasonable accommodation" of religion requirement in Title VII
of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 150 in part because they thought it invited
or required an overly entangling adjudication of sincerity.' 5 1 One
Commonwealth, 186 Va. 839; 847-48, 44 S.E.2d 409, 413 (1947) (erroneous instruction on
levels of intent in homicide prosecution arising from snake handling). Most decisions have
deemed sincerity irrelevant to prosecutions for handling venomous snakes, e.g., Hill v. State,
88 So. 2d 880 (Ala. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 88 So. 2d 887 (Ala. 1956); Lawson v. Commonwealth, 291 Ky. 437, 164 S.W.2d 972 (1942); State v. Massey, 229 N.C. 734, 51 S.E.2d 179,
appealdismissedsub nom. Bunn v. North Carolina, 336 U.S. 942 (1949); Harden v. State, 188
Tenn. 17, 216 S.W.2d 708 (1948). See also Harris v. Harris, 343 So. 2d 762 (Miss. 1977)
(mother could not be deprived of custody because of membership in snake-handling church
where no evidence of danger to child). The Biblical origin of this practice is Mark 16:17-18.
148. E.g., People v. Vogelgesang, 221 N.Y. 290, 293, 116 N.E. 977, 978 (1917) (good faith
could not justify "combin[ing] faith with patent medicine"); People v. Cole, 219 N.Y. 98,
110-12, 113 N.E. 790, 794-95 (1916) (conviction of Christian Science practitioner reversed
because jury should have been instructed to pass on his good-faith compliance with religious
tenets); State v. Verbon, 167 Wash. 140, 146, 149, 8 P.2d 1083, 1085, 1086 (1932) (good faith
irrelevant to determining whether faith healer practiced medicine without a license).
149. See Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 457 (1971) (sincerity is "a concept that
can bear only so much adjudicative weight"); United States v. Kahane, 396 F. Supp. 687,
698 (E.D.N.Y. 1975); Teterud v. Gillman, 385 F. Supp. 153, 157 (S.D. Iowa 1974) ("[tlhe
court can never know with assurance whether Teterud is sincere or insincere"); Katz v. Superior Court, 73 Cal. App. 3d 952, 987-88, 141 Cal. Rptr. 234, 255-56 (1977) (question of
proof of sincerity "not settled" by Ballard). See also M. KONVITZ, supra note 46, at 27-50;
Greenawalt, Book Review, 70 COLUM. L. REV. 1133, 1135-37 (1970) (disputing Konvitz'
view that there should be no sincerity tests in First Amendment litigation). In Brown v.
Dade Christian Schools, 556 F.2d 310 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1063 (1978), a
case involving claimed exemption from civil rights suit liability, Judge Goldberg, concurring
in the denial of such exemption, noted that the "fine and searching distinctions among various free exercise claimants" that would be required if exemptions were recognized "would
raise serious constitutional questions with respect to the proper functioning of courts in sensitive religion clause adjudication. Courts are of course competent to sort sincere from insincere religious contentions, but the process of doing so, and of striking different balances
when confronted with sincere claims posing subtle variations in religious dogma, inevitably
embroils courts undesirably in religious controversies." 556 F.2d at 323.
150. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (1974). The requirement did not appear in the original 1964
enactment, but the section was amended in 1972 to define religion as "includ[ing] all aspects
of religious observance and practice, as well as belief, unless an employer demonstrates that
he is unable to reasonably accommodate to an employee's or prospective employee's religious observance or practice without undue hardship on the conduct of the employer's business." Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103.
151. See Anderson v. General Dynamics Convair Aerospace Div., 489 F. Supp. 782, 791
(S.D. Cal. 1980), rev'd and remanded, 648 F.2d 1247 (9th Cir. 1981); Isaac v. Butler's Shoe
Corp., 511 F. Supp. 108 (N.D. Ga. 1980); Gavin v. Peoples Natural Gas Co., 464 F. Supp.
622, 632 (W.D. Pa. 1979), vacated and remandedon other grounds, 613 F.2d 482 (3d Cir.
1980). See also TWA v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63 (1977) (constitutional question not reached);
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court, in upholding the right of Jehovah's Witnesses in a public school
not to stand, for religious reasons, during the singing of the National
Anthem, noted, "[N]o matter how unfounded or even ludicrous the
professed belief may seem to others, [the First Amendment] guarantees
to the plaintiffs the right to claim that their objection to standing is
based upon religious belief, and the sincerity or reasonablenessof this
claim may not be examined by this or any other Court."' 5 2 Sincerity
thus becomes interwoven with reasonableness or verity of beliefs, as
Justice Jackson warned it must. The court's refusal to inquire into
"sincerity or reasonableness" illustrates Jackson's thesis that the two
are not properly separable.' 53
In Sherbert v. Verner,'5 4 the Supreme Court alluded obliquely to
this point. That case involved South Carolina's requirement that applicants for state unemployment compensation be willing to work Saturdays. The Court struck down this interpretation of the unemployment
law because it unjustifiably burdened Ms. Sherbert's exercise of her
Seventh Day Adventist faith and impermissibly favored Sunday worshippers. Responding to the articulated fear that "the filing of fraudulent claims by unscrupulous claimants feigning religious objections to
Saturday work might not only dilute the unemployment compensation
fund but also hinder the scheduling by employers of necessary Saturday work," the Court noted, first, that "there is no proof whatever to
warrant such fears of malingering or deceit," and second, that
[e]ven if consideration of such evidence is not foreclosed by the
prohibition against judicial inquiry into the truth or falsity of religious beliefs, United States v. Ballard, . . .- a question as to
which we intimate no view since it is not before us-it is highly
doubtful whether such evidence would be sufficient to warrant a
substantial infringement of religious liberties. For even if the
possibility of spurious claims did threaten to dilute the fund and
disrupt the scheduling of work, it would plainly be incumbent
upon the appellees to demonstrate that no alternative forms of
regulation would combat such abuses without infringing First
Cummins v. Parker Seal Co., 516 F.2d 544, 552-53 (6th Cir. 1975) (upholding reasonable
accommodation provision), af'd by an equally divided court, 429 U.S. 65 (1976); Dewey v.
Reynolds Metals Co., 429 F.2d 324, 334-35 (6th Cir. 1970) (upholding reasonable accommodation EEOC guideline), a 'd by an equally divided court, 402 U.S. 689 (1971).
152. Sheldon v. Fannin, 221 F. Supp. 766, 775 (D. Ariz. 1963) (emphasis added). Ballard,among others, was cited for this proposition. The court in Sheldon observed that the
sincerity of the religious objection "may strain credulity." Id See also Banks v. Board of
Pub. Instruction, 314 F. Supp. 285, 295-96 (S.D. Fla. 1970).
153. See United States v. Ballard, 332 U.S. 78, 92-93 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting). See
note 50 supra.
154. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
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Amendment
Justice Brennan in this passage suggests not only that the issue left
undecided by Ballardis still very much open, but also that the holding
of Ballardmay well compel the outcome that Justice Jackson insisted it
must, for "fraudulent claims by unscrupulous claimants" and "malingering or deceit" signal a sincerity, not a truth-or-falsity, issue; South
Carolina did not argue that the Adventists' interpretation of scripture
was misguided.
Parenthetically, sincerity was largely irrelevant to South Carolina's
concern. It was feared that numbers, not profundity, of claims might
dilute the fund and disrupt the rhythms of industry. This possibility
existed regardless of the sincerity of the claimants. If the dilemma
arose in sufficiently compelling fashion and no less restrictive alternatives were available, the state interest would presumably justify the infringement of religious consciences regardless of whether they were
genuine or feigned.
Despite the irrelevance of sincerity, testing for it is easier in the
Sherbert situation than in religious fraud cases in which the claimant
asserts not that her belief prevents her from working on the Sabbath,
but that the practice or dogma of her church will yield salvation. For
example, the sincerity of the conscientious objector can sometimes be
tested by relatively objective evidence, without assessing the credibility
of belief. Such a test was performed, for instance, in Dobkin v. District
of Columbia,156 where a Saturday Sabbatarian's claim to exemption
from court attendance was viewed skeptically after he had been discovered working at his office on Saturday.
If sincerity could always be measured by the disparity between actions and professed beliefs, it would be somewhat less constitutionally
troublesome. 57 But even this apparently simple test, on closer examination, becomes problematic. Occasional deviation from Sabbath observance does not prove full-blown hypocrisy, just as occasional
indulgence at a non-kosher restaurant ought not to preclude all claim
of need for a kosher diet.' 58 To one unacquainted with the intricacies
of particular religious commandments, evidence of any incongruity be155. Id at 407. Justice Harlan, dissenting, thought that Sherbert overruled Braunfeld v.
Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961), which had upheld Sunday closings against a free-exercise challenge. 374 U.S. at 421-23.
156. 194 A.2d 657 (D.C. 1963).
157. One commentator appears to view it in this sense. Comment, supra note 4, at 76364, 777 n.151.
158. In this connection it might be noted that Dr. New's deviations from rectitude did
not really prove that he was insincere in preaching its value. See text accompanying notes
27-33 supra.
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tween practice and asserted belief may seem damning. Religious practice is not a perfect science, however. Under this "incongruity"
approach, new or sudden converts would have little chance to prove
their sincerity.' 59 Moreover, the prospect of government agents or tort
of deviaplaintiffs dogging the heels of religious claimants for evidence
160
attractive.
particularly
not
is
belief
tion from asserted
Where there is no congruence between the exemption claimed and
"objective" evidence of deviation from belief, discerning sincerity is
even more vexing. Attention or inattention to the Sabbath, for instance, would be irrelevant to a conscientious objector's claim that his
religion precluded participation in war, even if the belief were said to
derive from orthodox Seventh Day Adventism, for surely one need not
adhere to every detail of a creed in order to be sincere. In fact, some
creeds, such as Judaism, themselves acknowledge different levels of adherence. In many conscientious-objector cases, there will be no objective evidence to which to turn, save the young person's articulation of
his beliefs and the seriousness or eloquence with which he declaims
them to his draft board. Not the insincere, but only the less articulate,
are likely to be weeded out by a sincerity standard in such a
situation. 161
Occasionally, sincerity may be thought to be sufficiently evident by
the circumstances of the claim. In In re Jenison,162 a woman's willingness to face imprisonment for contempt of court was enough to show
her sincere opposition to jury duty. Similarly, in United States v.
Kahane,163 Rabbi Meir Kahane's insistence on his right to receive kosher food while in prison was thought sincere in part because of the
"repetitive and spartan nature" of the strict kosher diet under prison
conditions. 164
159. See e.g., Clay v. United States, 403 U.S. 698, 702-04 (1971) (per curiam) (Clay's
belief not necessarily insincere simply because recently manifested).
160. See, e.g., United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 185 (1965) (FBI available to assist
draft boards in determining sincerity).
161. As the Court in Gillette explained, "There is even a danger of unintended religious
discrimination [in a sincerity inquiry]-a danger that a claim's chances of success would be
greater the more familiar or salient the claim's connection with conventional religiosity
could be made to appear." 401 U.S. at 457. See also Thomas v. Review Bd. of the Ind.
Employment Security Div., 450 U.S. 707 (1981).
162. 265 Minn. 96, 120 N.W.2d 515 (exemption from jury duty), remanded,375 U.S. 14,
on remand, 267 Minn. 136, 125 N.W.2d 588 (1963).
163. 396 F. Supp. 687, 698 (E.D.N.Y. 1975).
164. Id at 703. See also West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 643
(1943) (Black & Douglas, JJ., concurring) (devoutness of children's belief "is evidenced by
their willingness to suffer persecution and punishment, rather than make the pledge"); Stevens v. Berger, 428 F. Supp. 896, 901 (E.D.N.Y. 1977) (religious objection to furnishing
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While this is a nice solution, it might be thought to refine the
sincerity inquiry out of existence. That, in fact, may have been Judge
Weinstein's purpose in Kahane, for while he recognized the right of the
government in theory "to determine the sincerity of religious beliefs
where obligations and rights flow from that determination," he realized
that "such inquiry must proceed cautiously since the state should generally avoid placing itself in the position of deciding which religious
claims are meritorious." '65 If the "repetitive and spartan nature" of a
kosher diet under prison conditions were not enough to dispose of the
fear of a flood tide of false claims, Judge Weinstein left room for an
obvious "shams and absurdities" standard of review. 166 This, in turn,
as we have seen, is really a definitional inquiry. The result of Kahane is
that once a claim is judged truly religious in the definitional sense, that
is, deriving from some core of beliefs reflecting concern with ultimate
issues in human life, it should be honored, absent countervailing state
interests of sufficient magnitude.
The Supreme Court, sub silentlo, may have embraced this view as
well. In Thomas v. Review Board of the Indiana Employment Security
Division, 6 7 which involved the voluntariness of a job termination for
purposes of unemployment compensation, the Court paid lip service to
the requirement that the claimant's religious compulsion for leaving
work be "honest," but also expressed its discomfort with any in-depth
sincerity inquiry: "[Allthough detailed inquiry by employers into applicants' religious beliefs is undesirable, there is no evidence in the record to indicate that such inquiries will occur in Indiana, or that they
have occurred in any of the states that extend benefits to people in the
petitioner's position."' 6 8
The Supreme Court's earlier delphic aside in Sherbert does not
indicate whether it considered these complications to be inherent in
sincerity tests. 169 At the very least, the Court in both Sherbert and
Thomas blended the ideas of sincerity and verity in a way that indicates that it does not view Ballardas having approved adjudication of
the former.
Religious fraud cases, unlike other situations in which sincerity or
good faith may be at issue, merge these matters with truth or falsity in a
social security numbers upheld; witness thought claimants were sincere because "I don't
believe they would have gone through all this if they were not").
165. 396 F. Supp. at 698 (citing United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1944)).
166. .1d at 703.
167. 450 U.S. 707 (1981).
168. Id at 1432.
169. See text accompanying notes 154-55 supra.

HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY

[Vol. 9:153

fundamental legal sense; that is, falsity of an asserted faith or belief is
crucial to fraud adjudication. Fraud presupposes falsity, and if that
issue cannot be litigated, the central element of the tort dissolves. The
Supreme Court did not face this salient point in Ballard; only Chief
Justice Stone's dissent denied the materiality of actual falsity, thus
reading that element out of fraud. 7 ' Without falsity, however, both
the harm and the causation are gone from the suit. As Professor Kurland, discussing Ballard, observed, "the very essence of the charge required proof of the falsehood of the assertions."''
In the Ballardtrial itself, as Judge Denman demonstrated in a dissent to the court of appeals decision on remand,' 72 the distinction between truth and sincerity had not been maintained. When a juror
asked one of the defendants "if he ever precipitated anything,"' 73 the
defendant did not answer,
[w]hereupon the court abandoned its ruling excluding evidence
upon which the jury could "speculate" "whether these incidents
actually happened." Instead of declaring the question of the happening of the fact of such a "divine" miracle as irrelevant and its
pursuit a denial of the accused's religious liberty, the court itself
asked, "Did you yourself ever precipitate?"' 74
Ultimately, the court told the jury that the question of precipitation
would be argued by both sides and was "'a matter for you gentlemen
to decide.' 175 The prosecutor took advantage of the opportunity and
made "sneering remarks about the absence of any proof of such divine
76
and supernatural happening as the precipitation of precious metals." 1
The Ballardtrial thus incarnated the very fusion77of sincerity and verity
that the trial judge thought could be avoided.'
A recent review of the career of the renowned theosophist, Mad78
ame Blavatsky, a precursor of the Ballards, makes this same point.'
Blavatsky's popularity derived in part from her claims to have received,
170. See text accompanying notes 47-48 supra.
171. P. KURLANb, supra note 46, at 77.
172. 152 F.2d 941, 944 (9th Cir. 1945) (Denman, J., dissenting).
173. Id at 947. The religious claims had included supernatural ability to precipitate
"money, riches, and other material needs." Id
174. Id
175. Id (emphasis omitted).
176. Id The prosecutor also disparagingly compared the claimed "ascension" of Guy
Ballard after his death with Jesus Christ's, and accused the Ballards of being "false
prophets." Record Appendix, vol. IV, Transcript of Record, at 1516, 1524, United States v.
Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1944).
177. See notes 37-39 and accompanying text supra.
178. Zweig, Talking to the Dead and Other 4musements, N.Y. Times Book Rev., Oct. 5,
1980, at 11, col. I.
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via precipitation, letters from "Mahatmas" in Tibet. Skeptics proved
the letters to be fake, but, as the reviewer perceived, "Confronted with
[Blavatsky], we are obliged to rethink our ideas of sincerity and truth,
for there is a kind of obsessive fraudulence that is so passionate, so
engrossing,
that it imposes itself, for all intents and purposes, as
79
fact."1

The rejection of a sincerity test in religious fraud cases may well
mean that classic charlatans, if they are careful to maintain a front of
coherent religious doctrine and religious context when purveying their
views, will continue, unabated by civil or criminal liability, to relieve
spiritually impoverished or vulnerable Americans of substantial funds
or even to impel them to alter their lives radically. The rule of religious
caveat emptor is proper, however, because the First Amendment imports it into our constitutional law. That is to say, "spiritual poison" is
"precisely the thing the Constitution put[s] beyond the reach of the
8
prosecutor"'1
and of the civil claimant. If, as Professor Kurland suggests, this makes religious fraud "the insoluble problem under any theory of the meaning of the first amendment religion clauses,"' that is a
relatively small price to pay for the salutary principle that religious
"hypocrisy" as well as religious "falsity" is constitutionally
unassailable.
IV.

Context

Religious status obviously does not bestow immunity from liability
for all "fraudulent" statements or promises, but only for those made in
a religious context. The fund collector who pretends affiliation with a
particular church and the money-diverting minister are two jurisprudential examples of religious defrauders who are subject to suit because
their representations
do not involve matters of religious persuasion and
2
8

belief.1

Those are easy cases. A harder one, raised in the Scientology litigation, is belief about cause and cure of disease. As Judge Wright
pointed out in Founding Church, "[w]e cannot assume as a matter of
law that all theories describing curative techniques or powers are medi179. Id In a more contemporary illustration, the New York Times reported that evangelist Oral Roberts had received nearly $5 million "after sending supporters a letter in which
he said he had had a talk with a 900-foot tall Jesus Christ." N.Y. Times, Nov. 1, 1980, at 12,
col. 6 (city ed.).
180. United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 95 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
181. P. KURLAND, supra note 46, at 75.
182. The former example is from Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 306-07 (1940);
the latter is from Justice Jackson's dissent in United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. at 92.
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cal and therefore not religious. Established religions claim for their
practices the power to treat or prevent disease, or include within their
hagiologies accounts of miraculous cures." ' 3 Such curative phenomena range from the supposed healing powers of sacred shrines such as
Lourdes to wholesale focus of a religious system upon a spiritual theory
such as the Christian Scientists' view of physical ailing and healing.
Christian Science literature, in particular, is replete with most explicit
representations. For example, "[t]he adoption of scientific religion and
of divine healing will ameliorate sin, sickness, and death. . . . Mind as
far outweighs drugs in the cure of disease as in the cure of sin." ' 4
When representations like these are made in a religious context, the
listener or potential adherent must be deemed on notice that he or she
is in a realm of faith and belief far distant from the territory of civil
adjudication.
Just as clearly, however, consumers should be protected from false
curative claims not made in a religious context, and judging the context
can be arduous. Even in a church, not every statement about disease
partakes of the spiritual; even in a baseball park, an evangelist may
preach or practice faith healing. Two New York cases involving faith
healers suggest some elements of the necessary analysis.
In People v. Cole,' S the court of appeals reversed a Christian Scientist's conviction for practicing medicine without a license on the
ground that he qualified for the statutory exemption involving healing
efforts performed in conjunction with the "religious tenets of any
church."'8 6 The defendant had represented that he cured by prayer,
and the court found that he did so in good faith.' 8 7
A year later, in People v. Vogelgesang, 88 the court affirmed the
conviction of a defendant who, although claiming to be a spiritualist,
had given medicine, had rubbed the patient's body with liniment, and
183. 409 F.2d at 1161.

184. M.

EDDY, SCIENCE AND HEALTH WITH KEY TO THE SCRIPTURES

141, 149 (1971).

AhIstrom describes Christian Science as an outgrowth of Swedenborgian spiritualism, "precisely formulated, highly organized, and authoritatively led." S. AHLSTROM, supra note 2, at
487.
185. 219 N.Y. 98, 113 N.E. 790 (1916).
186. Id at 102, 113 N.E. at 794.
187. Id at 103-05, 110-12, 113 N.E. at 792, 794. To bolster its conclusion, the court
noted that the defendant did not attempt to diagnose, nor was there "laying on of hands,
manipulation, massage, or outward ceremonial." Id at 108, 113 N.E. at 793. It is not clear
whether or not those factors could in themselves tip the scale against a defendant if belief,
prayer, and religious practice are held out as the main avenues to health, ie., if the context is
plainly and primarily religious.
188. 221 N.Y. 290, 116 N.E. 977 (1917) (Cardozo, J.).
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had "never uttered a word about Spiritualism."' 8 9 The court asserted
that "things were done by this defendant which no good faith could
justify. He combined faith with patent medicine." 190
It is possible that the court of appeals was simply reflecting an
unacknowledged preference for more respectable types of religious exercise. But whatever is thought of the factual line drawn in these two
cases, a workable principle emerges. Where a patient, consumer, or
adherent is fairly on notice that the relief offered addresses the spiritual
aspects of physical ills, failure to cure or lack of medical support for the
theory of cure advanced should not, even in the absence of a statutory
exemption, be actionable as breach of contract, fraud, or practicing
medicine without a license, no matter how emphatic or hypocritical the
assurances of the religious healer.
In the Boston Scientology cases, the plaintiffs attempted to distinguish the claims of cure that Scientology literature made from more
traditional faith-healing promises on the basis of Scientology's alleged
emphasis on "scientific proof' of the efficacy of auditing.191 The reference may have been either to Dianetics' science-and-technology jargon
in describing mental processes and aberrations or merely to the numbers of "success stories" that the church sometimes publicizes. If the
latter, Scientology claims do not differ much from those of classic faith
healing; if the former, the issue is more tangled because insistence on
scientific, as opposed to religious or spiritual, healing may be a factor
suggesting that a potential adherent was not put sufficiently on notice
that he or she was being told about a religious system. A preliminary
factual inquiry might thus be appropriate to assess how much the religious aspect of auditing, and that of Scientology generally, was set
forth-in other words, a context test.
But mere inclusion of the word "science," as the Christian Science
movement itself illustrates, does not obliterate a religious context. In
our time, when even mystical experience is capable of neurological explanation,1 92 it simply may be anachronistic to think in terms of a sharp
295, 102 N.E.2d 340
189. id at 291, 116 N.E. at 977. See also People v. Handzik, 410 Ill.
(1951), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 927 (1952) (conviction upheld; defendant not within faithhealing exemption because she used title of doctor, as well as "holy" water and "atomic"
water, and various machines and "hot wires"); State v. Verbon, 167 Wash. 140, 8 P.2d 1083
(1932) (conviction upheld, relying in part on Vogelgesang, because of bad faith and use of
drugs).
190. 221 N.Y. at 293, 116 N.E. at 978.
191. Hearing on defendants' motion to dismiss, Sept. 10, 1980, Van Schaick v. Church of
Scientology of California, Civ. No. 79-2491-G (D. Mass. ified Dec. 13, 1979) (Garrity, J.).
192. See, e.g., F. CONWAY & J. SIEGELMAN, supra note 2, at 134-82 (discussing possible
physiological explanations for religious conversion experiences); Comment, supra note 4, at
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dichotomy between religion and science. Scientology, with its emphasis on mental and psychosomatic causes of affliction, is an example of
the overlap; yet overall, its doctrines, as Judge Wright recognized, are
religious. 193 It is difficult to see how, with this doctrinal background,
an institution that calls itself a church could be said to offer its major
activity or service in a secular context.
What has been said above concerning faith healing and physical
cures applies as well as to other accusations made by litigants against
Scientology: false promises regarding auditing's ability to increase IQ,
enhance creativity, and promote success in school or career. Aside
from the secular difficulties in adjudicating such claims because of the
relatively vague and indefinable nature of the alleged promises, 194 the
truth of those statements-like the truth of claims about improved
physical health-should be nonjusticiable when religiously framed.
Whether implicitly or explicitly made, such promises about future potency and happiness are in fact common to most religions.
In determining religious context, a useful analogy may be drawn
to the concept of "centrality" found elsewhere in free-exercise case law.
In Wisconsin v. Yoder,' 95 the insistence by the Amish on removing their
children from school after the eighth grade, although superficially appearing distant from religious dogma, was found, on closer analysis, to
be central to the sect's faith. 9 6 Similarly, in cases involving claimed
exemption from drug laws, a critical inquiry has been whether the sacramental drug-induced state was a "cornerstone" of the defendant's
faith or whether he could conscientiously practice his religion without
it.' 97 Opinions reaching different conclusions on the centrality of long
hair in American Indian religion provide other examples. 198
770 n.95 and sources cited therein (religious beliefs "implicate the individual's interior ordering of his world. Whether this 'ordering' is 'merely' a series of electrochemical brain
states or something qualitatively different, it is wholly personal to the believer").
193. Founding Church of Scientology of Washington, D.C. v. United States, 409 F.2d
1146, 1160 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
194. Cf. Turner v. Unification Church, 473 F. Supp. 367, 378 (D.R.I. 1978) (promises of
a "better world" not cognizable in quantum meruit because plaintiff did not expect compensation for work), aff'd, 602 F.2d 458 (1st Cir. 1979); A. CoRmiN, CONTACTS § 145 (1950)
("illusory" contracts unenforceable).
195. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
196. Id at 215-19.
197. See text accompanying notes 120-26 supra.
198. Compare Teterud v. Gillman, 358 F. Supp. 153 (S.D. Iowa 1974) with New Rider v.
Board of Educ., 480 F.2d 693 (10th Cir. 1973) and United States exrel. Goings v. Aaron, 350
F. Supp. 1 (D. Minn. 1972). Cf. Ho Ah Kow v. Nunan, 12 F. Cas. 252 (C.C.D. Cal. 1879)
(cutting of queue, a mark of disgrace in Chinese prisoner's religion, violated equal protection clause).
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The centrality test itself has been criticized as invasive of the First
Amendment. 99 In one recent case,2°° a court held that the Unitarian
Church's program of sex education, part of its Sunday school curriculum, was constitutionally protected on religious grounds regardless of
its centrality: "The protection the Constitution extends to the exercise
of religion does not turn on the theological importance of the disputed
activity." 20 ' If centrality is seen, as it was here and in the Leary case,2 2
as a way of trying to separate important religious practices from peripheral ones, it does indeed seem to intrude into territory made sacrosanct by Ballard. But if it is viewed and used as a way of distinguishing
a church's religious pursuits from its secular ones, it can be a guide to
context.
In the Scientology cases, for example, it was evident from the
pleadings that auditing was the central practice of the religion, since
auditing was the process by which one cleared away aberrations or "engrams" and achieved the wholesome states of "clear" and "beyond."20 3
Representations made about the benefits of auditing were therefore
made in a religious context, much as are representations about the benefits of Roman Catholic confession or of unburdening oneself on Yom
Kippur. In one of the Boston cases, in fact, the complaint specified that
auditing had been likened to confession, only "better." 2" Such a comparison, in the absence of an explicit secular reference, would seem to
make the religious context fairly clear and to put the potential convert
on notice that, should auditing fail for her, she would no more be entitled to sue the Church of Scientology for fraud than to sue the Roman
Catholic Church.
By contrast, alleged misrepresentations in Scientology literature
25
about the educational attainments of the founder, L. Ron Hubbard
199. See Brown v. Dade Christian Schools, 556 F.2d 310, 318 n.7 (5th Cir. 1977)
(Goldberg, J., concurring) (noting apparent irrelevance of centrality in conscientious-objector adjudication); M. KoNVITZ, supra note 46, at 79; Marcus, The Forum of Conscience: Applying Standards Under the Free Exercise Clause, 1973 DUKE L.J. 1217, 1250-51 (once
[or] 'indispensable'
practice deemed religious, "questions regarding what is 'essential' .
* . . better left to the theologians").
200. Unitarian Church West v. McConnell, 337 F. Supp. 1252 (E.D. Wis. 1972), af'd
without opinion, 474 F.2d 1351 (7th Cir. 1973), vacatedon othergrounds, 416 U.S. 932 (1974).
201. 1d at 1257.
202. See text accompanying notes 124-26 supra.
203. For a more complete description of auditing, see note 12 supra.
204. Amended Complaint at 3, Troy v. Church of Scientology of Boston, Civ. No. 41073
(Mass. Super. Ct., Suffolk County filed Apr. 2, 1980).
205. All the Boston Scientology complaints alleged that the church had claimed Hubbard was a nuclear physicist with degrees from Princeton and George Washington Universities. In its appellate brief in Christofferson v. Church of Scientology of Portland, No.
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do not appear to involve religious belief or practice. A lawsuit limited
to allegations of this sort probably would not, on its face, run afoul of
the First Amendment. The materiality of such allegations is questionable; however, the extent to which confidence in Hubbard's credentials
influenced a decision to join the church might be marginal. Although
former adherents probably could argue persuasively their right to litigate this question of causation, their claims would be weak ones if only
this type of representation, and not statements about auditing, were
justiciable.
A variation on the context theme arises where a concededly religious institution makes promises which are at once religious and secular, 2as06in SecuritiesandExchange Commission v. World Radio Mission,
Inc.
Although the Mission was "'a religious organization engaged
in worldwide evangelical religious activities'" and there was "no dispute" about its religious purpose or the sincerity of its leaders,20 7 the
First Circuit Court of Appeals thought these facts irrelevant to the
Commission's plea for a preliminary injunction against fraudulent representations as to the Mission's sale of "Land Bonus Loan Plans." The
plans were securities within the purview of the law regardless of the
possible truth of the Mission's claim that the investor "also, in effect,
subscribes to religious 'articles of faith'" and contentions that the investments could be viewed as religious donations. 208 The misrepresentations that the Commission sought to curtail, concerning the terms of
the investments and the seller's financial condition, bore little relation
to religious practice; thus, although the Mission was religious, these
promises were secular.
The key factors in a context analysis are similar to those used to
determine religious status: The representations must appeal to faith or
belief and emphasize ultimate concerns of conscience, spiritual health
or human existence. Secondary factors might be outward signs such as
ritual or prayer.209
A7704-05184 (Or. Cir. Ct., Multnomah County Sept. 5, 1979, appealdocketed, No. 15952
(Ct. App. Oct. 31, 1979), the church suggested that "mythology" about its founder was entitled to First Amendment protection, but the argument seems dubious, at least absent evidence of religious or mythical context.
206. 544 F.2d 535 (1st Cir. 1976).
207. Id at 537.
208. Id at 538 (emphasis omitted). A similar fact situation was presented recently in
United States v. Rasheed, 663 F.2d 843 (9th Cir. 1981) (affirming mail fraud convictions
based on religiously flavored pyramid scheme). The court held that the religious aspect
made no difference where the defendants were "insincere"; a better approach might have
analyzed whether the solicitation of "donations" based on promises of fourfold increases in
returns was primarily secular or religious in context.
209. But see note 117 supra.
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Although the context inquiry will sometimes be very tricky, the
line drawing required ultimately seems less problematic and less intrusive of First Amendment values than does a sincerity probe. This is so
because, unlike sincerity criteria, the context test could be in large part
prescriptive; individuals and institutions could conform their conduct
to it. At least as to the context element, then, immunity from religious
fraud liability would be largely within the control of the groups potentially vulnerable to it rather than in the hands of courts or juries. Any
religious organization would then be on notice that if it concealed its
religious orientation while making potentially fraudulent representations, it could lose First Amendment protection. In borderline cases, we
was made in a religious context "when we
statement
would know that a' 21
0
is.
it
that
are told
A religious context test would have a threefold salutary effect.
First, it would offer a measure of deterrence in that some speakers
might eschew religious orientation for fear of detracting from an otherwise forceful or convincing appeal. On the other side, the listener either would be aware of the religious context of representations and
weigh that factor in his decision whether or not to rely on them, or
would be able to sue for fraud. Second, religious speakers would know
how to avoid fraud liability without suffering any inhibition of their
proselytizing activities.21 Willingness to clarify religious context
would earn themprimafacie protection on that issue (although failure
explicitly to identify the context as religious should not preclude a finding that it was in fact religious where other evidence suggests that it
was). Third, and finally, courts would have a relatively objective and
workable standard for adjudication of this aspect of religious fraud.
V.

The Procedural Scheme

The inquiries into primafade religious status and into religious
context should be made by a judge. They are issues of constitutional
law, or mixed questions of fact and constitutional law, which cannot be
left to the majoritarian pressures that a jury usually reflects. Similarly,
they should be fully reviewable on appeal.212
They are also preliminary questions. Deferring them to trial, or
'
210. Weiss, Privilege,Posture and Protection- Religion" in the Law, 73 YALE L.J. 593,
604 (1964). Wiiss would go considerably further than this author, by dispensing with the
definitional inquiry and accepting as "in the religious domain" any claim that "is held out as
being religious in nature." Id
211. See text accompanying notes 57-70 supra.
212. See Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 187-89 (1964); Brown v. Dade Christian
Schools, 556 F.2d 310, 316-17 (5th Cir. 1977) (Goldberg, J., concurring).
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even to a summary judgment that may come after years of extensive
discovery, subjects churches to oppressive and potentially destructive
litigation. Thus, for the same reason that "chilling effect" is a factor in
free speech litigation, 1 3 these issues should be decided early in the lawsuit--on the pleadings if possible.
There is no good reason to defer resolution of these questions
when they arise in a religious fraud lawsuit. If a complaint on its face
reveals that the representations at issue were made in a religious context, a motion to dismiss is appropriate; if a factual showing is necessary, it can be limited to religious status and context in the manner of
evidentiary considerations commonly permitted pursuant to motions to
dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction or venue. Discovery can be
similarly confined by protective order until the preliminary issues are
decided. A conclusory complaint that in broad strokes attempts to circumvent religious fraud immunity by failing to define the context, or
by alleging "mind control" without more, should be subject to a motion
to dismiss, or to strike for failure to particularize, like any other sort of
fraud claim.2" 4 If the claimant intends to rely upon clear sham, facts
suggesting why the religion in question does not meet the ultimate-concern test should be particularized.
There has been occasional reference in free-exercise cases to allocation of the burden of proof; the question has not often proved decisive.215 Although that issue is beyond the scope of the present study, it
seems reasonable that the burden of establishing aprimafacie case of
religious status falls on the party asserting the immunity. The relevant
facts, witnesses and doctrinal works are within that party's control.
Often aprimafaciecase of status can be made by judicial notice or
by reference to the pleadings. Sometimes submission of relevant literature and testimony by ministers or outside experts would be called for.
The burden ought then to shift to the party asserting that the immunity
does not apply in order to rebut the primafacie showing if he or she
can. The rebuttal should not be an inquisition about sincerity, but
"pervasive pretext" might be shown through introduction of "doctrinal" literature not offered by the other side. More likely, the literature
and testimony in any case of disputed religious qualification will itself
either suffice or be seen by the judge as obvious sham.
213. See Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 486-87 (1965); New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 272 (1964); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963).
214. See FED. R. Civ. P. 9(b), 12(e)-(f).
215. See, e.g., Surinach v. Pesquera de Busquets, 604 F.2d 73, 76 (1st Cir. 1979); In re
Grady, 61 Cal. 2d 887, 888, 394 P.2d 728, 729, 39 Cal. Rptr. 912, 913 (1964); Giannella,
supra note 57, at 1428.
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Unless the pleadings specify how the statements or actions sued
upon were outside a religious context, it ought to be the burden of the
plaintiff at this preliminary stage to show that the claim deals only with
secular matters. These facts are within his or her knowledge. Relevant
here would be evidence that the party now claiming religious immunity
either concealed its religious status at material times or disclaimed reliance upon religion in advertising benefits, cures, or the like. The content of the representations and their centrality to the religion's beliefs
and practices also plays a role. The overall focus, however, should be
on: (1) protecting religions, especially strange or obnoxious ones, from
claims that ultimately are not adjudicable without trampling the freeexercise guarantee and (2) protecting them at the earliest possible stage
of litigation.
Conclusion
In the heat of debate over the new religions, their great similarity
to earlier American organizations and movements is sometimes overlooked. It is unclear whether or not today's parents are more distressed
by their children's seemingly mindless devotion to local gurus than
were onlookers in the last century when Shakers, Mennonites, Hutterites, Mormons, theosophists, faith healers, speakers-in-tongues,
Montanists, Donatists, perfectionists, Jehovah's Witnesses, Seventh
Day Adventists, and other groups abounded.21 6 However untenable
these older beliefs or their modem counterparts appear, and however
cynical their purveyors may be, the Court in Ballard made clear that in
a substantive sense our Constitution does not tolerate a cause of action
for religious fraud. Since testing sincerity is too nearly a proxy for a
substantive inquiry into truth, the remaining tasks facing a court in any
fraud-based claim against a new religion are to determine the religious
status of the organization and the context in which the alleged fraud
took place. If the defendant is, for constitutional purposes, a religion,
and if the alleged representations were made in a religious context, the
matter should not be justiciable.

216. See generally S.

AHLSTROM,

supra note 2.

